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I. INTRODUCTION: THE FUTURE OF E PLURJBUS UNUM

Ethnicity-the classification of people into groups based upon physical
characteristics, common origins and shared cultures-is a defining
characteristic of the American nation. It remains the central problem that
preoccupies us eleven score years after a self-appointed group of white
Anglo-Saxon men declared not merely that all men were created equal'
but that this fact was self-evident. Since 1776 the United States has been
engaged in a painful and still-incomplete struggle to give effect to the
central meaning of that astonishing declaration.2
Whatever the United States is, it most certainly is not and never was
the mere elevation of a tribe to sovereign status. It is not even the sharing
of sovereignty by geographically proximate indigenous peoples, as is, for
example, the case in, say, Nigeria and India. Rather, the United States
is something altogether different: a 200-year old political and social
experiment based upon an agglomeration of voluntary immigration,
involuntary immigration, and indigenous peoples. Few can doubt that the
experiment has been vastly more successful for the first group than for the
1. One can, of course, debate whether the Declaration's implicit exclusion of women

and arguably implicit exclusion of blacks and Native Americans is a flaw that wholly or
partly disqualifies it from present-day commendation. One can perhaps forgive this flaw
by viewing the Declaration in the context of the broad sweep of prior history as well as
in light of subsequent events. In the opinion of this writer, it is precisely this broadbased perspective that should inform the history and social studies curriculum of the
public schools.
2. See, e.g., DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR
RACIAL JUSTICE (1987); MARY FRANCES BERRY, BLACK RESISTANCE, WHITE LAW: A
HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL RACISM IN AMERICA (1994); W.E. BURGHARDT DuBois,

THE SouLs OF BLACK FOLK (1903); ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND
WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (1976); GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO
PROBLEM AND MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA (1835); JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS

YEARS (1954-1965 (1987); GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GETTYSBURG: THE WORDS
THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992); MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X

(1964).
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second and third groups; equally incontrovertible is the fact that the
overall success of the experiment relies to a large extent on the state's
position with regard to the economic, social, and cultural aspects of

ethnicity. 3

Beyond these broad points of agreement, consensus has become

increasingly difficult. To begin with, state treatment of ethnicity arguably
depends upon how the various ethnic groups themselves desire to be
treated and even whether members of ethnic groups identify themselves
primarily by their group membership. 4 Neither of these attributes is
easily measured nor are they fixed over time. 5 Even assuming conclusive
resolution of these questions is possible, there remain the even more

difficult policy questions arising from a conflict between the principle of
individual non-discrimination and the principle of differential treatment of

ethnic groups. 6

It may be that no satisfactory resolution of these

conflicting principles is possible: a choice simply must be made.7

3. See generally Donald Horowitz, Democracy in Divided Societies, 4 J.
DEMOCRACY 18 (1993) (discussing the requirements for democracy in ethnically diverse
societies, using the examples of the former Soviet Union, the former Yugoslavia, and
several African nations).
4. See Michael Walzer, Pluralism: A Political Perspective, in HARVARD
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN ETHNIC GROUPS 781, 786-87 (Stephan Thernstrom et al.
eds., 1980) (discussing ethnic identification in a pluralistic society).

5. Seeki.
6. In the Declaration of Independence we encounter one of the first statements of
these two separate but related principles of equality and liberty, juxtaposed in a way that
seems to imply that one principle flows from the other. "All men are created equal" yet
each man "is endowed with certain unalienable rights." One principle does indeed flow
from the other; yet there is an inherent tension between equality and liberty. See
generally DEBATING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: RACE, GENDER, ETHNICITY, AND THE
POLIrICS OF INCLUSION (Nicolaus Mills ed., 1994).
7. The profound moral and legal difficulties implicit in this policy choice are amply
demonstrated in the Supreme Court's tortuous and shifting jurisprudence on the subject
of racial preferences. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S. Ct. 2097
(1995) (holding that minority preferences in federal contracting are subject to strict
scrutiny and overruling Metro Broadcasting(5-4 decision)); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v.
FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990) (subjecting minority preferences in the award of broadcast
licenses by federal government to intermediate scrutiny and upholding them as
constitutional); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding
unconstitutional local government public construction set-aside program for minority
construction contractors); United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 433 U.S. 193
(1979) (construing § 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as permitting
private, voluntary race-conscious affirmative action plans); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.
v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978) (plurality opinion) (holding special admissions program
for minority applicants to graduate school unconstitutional, but an admissions program
that takes into account the race of an applicant as one factor among many would be
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For much of our history these questions were not explicitly resolved
in part because of a program of invidious discrimination against certain
groups8 and in part because there existed a contra-ethnic ideology, almost
religious in fervor, which held that the United States was not about a
"search for roots" but rather an "escape from origins. "9 It is an ideology
summed up in the national credo still emblazoned on our currency and
public buildings: E Pluribus Unum. As a matter of law, the program of
state-sponsored invidious discrimination has ended. 10 As a matter of
public attitude and government policy, the ideology of E Pluribus Unum
is under siege." These two historical trends are no doubt in some way
related.
There are some who argue, with some justification, that the ideology
of E Pluribus Unum is closely linked to the social policy identified with
Jim Crow and George Armstrong Custer, among other icons of white male
dominance.' 2
Surely the rise in ethnic consciousness (a social
phenomenon which developed in tandem with the demise of the more
virulent forms of legal ethnic discrimination) has led, in turn, to a more
positive self-image among many Americans, and to the establishment of
new and useful forms of political and social association.13 Just as surely,
the new ethnic consciousness has led to a re-examination of widely held
assumptions about our history and to long-overdue recognition of the role
and contribution of members of ethnic minority groups. 4
constitutionally permissible).
8. See generally KLUGER, supra note 2.
9. ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE DIsUNITING OF AMERICA 2 (1991).
10. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq.) (prohibiting racial discrimination in employment, public
education, and public accommodations); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See also Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (invalidating racial segregation of
public buses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (invalidating racial
segregation of public beaches).
11. See, e.g., RICHARD BERNSTEIN, DICTATORSHIP OF VIRTUE: MULTICULTURALISM AND THE BATTLE FOR AMERICA'S FUTURE (1994); JIM SLEEPER, THE
CLOSEST OF STRANGERS: LIBERALISM AND POLITICS OF RACE INNEW YORK (1990).
12. See, e.g., MOLEFI KETE AsANTE, THE AFROCENTRIC IDEA 21-34 (1987);
HACKER, supra note 2, at 172-73.
13. See Walzer, supra note 4, at 783-85 (discussing pluralism in "practice" by
various nations).
14. See, e.g., FREEDOM'S PLOW: TEACHING INTHE MULTICULTURAL CLASSROOM
(Theresa Perry & James W. Fraser eds., 1993); NAT'L CTR. FOR HISTORY IN THE
SCHOOLS, UNIV. OF CA., L.A., NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR UNITED STATES HISTORY:
EXPLORING THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 3 (1994) [hereinafter NAT'L HISTORY
STANDARDS]; N.Y. STATE SOCIAL STUDIES REVIEW AND DEV. COMM., ONE NATION,
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Yet, like most complex ideologies, E Pluribus Unum has positive as
well as negative attributes-just as surely as a heightened ethnic
consciousness has negative as well as positive attributes. In the words of
one commentator, the "cult of ethnicity" I5 taken too far in the public
realm leads to a breakdown of national identity, a division of society "into
distinct and immutable ethnic and racial groups, each taught to cherish its
own apartness from the rest."' 6 As another commentator has pointed
out, "every viable nation has to have a common culture to survive in
peace.... [O]ne need look no further than [the former] Yugoslavia, the
[former] Soviet Union or Canada to see the accuracy of this
proposition." 17 The ideology of E Pluribus Unum, shorn of its negative
attributes noted above, can encompass multiculturalism ("Pluribus") while
still emphasizing our peculiar national character, shared ideals, and
common aspirations ("Unum").
An intellectual struggle is underway to redefine our national identity.
"[Tihe struggle [to establish the primacy of ethnic identity] is taking place
in many arenas-in our politics, our voluntary organizations, our
churches, our language-and in no arena more crucial than our [in] system
of education." 8 In some respects the struggle itself is a measure of the
vitality of our institutions and the continuing importance of the First
Amendment to protect and promote speech vital to the future of our
nation's social and political life. But in other respects, notably the
controversy over the content of the public educational curriculum, the
debate raises fairly novel and troubling questions about the scope of the
First Amendment because the object of the debate is precisely to shape the
content of government speech and to
19 shape such speech in ways that may
threaten core constitutional values.
This article seeks to examine the important emerging issue of radical
ethnocentric curriculum in the public schools and proposes a rationale for
judicial review of such curriculum. The rationale is based upon the
application of fundamental constitutional principles embedded in the First
and Fourteenth Amendments. The rationale is also based on the premise
that, throughout our history, the judiciary has played a unique and
dynamic role in promoting the stability and integrity of our political
MANY PEOPLES: A DECLARATION OF CULTURAL INDEPENDENCE 1-8 (1991) [hereinafter

ONE NATION].
15. SCHLESINGER, supra note 9, at 2.
16. ONE NATION, supra note 14, at 45 (dissenting comment of Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr.).
17. Id. at 39 (dissenting comment of Professor Kenneth T. Jackson).
18. SCHLESINGER,

supra note 9, at 2.

19. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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It is argued that the developing struggle over radical

ethnocentric curriculum in our public schools merits a principled judicial
response to assure the integrity of our public educational institutions
through the enforcement of core constitutional values.
II. RADICAL ETHNOCENTRIC CURRICULUM IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS
AND ITS THREAT TO CORE CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES

Over the past twenty years an increasing number of states have
revised standards for history and social studies curriculums in their public
schools by requiring the curriculums to include material about the roles
and contributions of women and minority racial and ethnic groups to the
history of the United States.2 The revised standards result in part from
new historical scholarship and teaching methods' and in part from the
increasing political pressure of various ethnic groups and organizations,
20. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995) (delineating the limit
of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683
(1974) (delineating limit of presidential "executive privilege"); New York Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (upholding newspaper's right to publish, without
prior restraint, information concerning U.S. military operations deemed confidential by
the government); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (establishing one person-one vote
principle); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional
state-sponsored segregation of public schools); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (delineating the limit of the President's authority under the
War Powers of the Constitution); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (applying
the First Amendment's free speech clause against the states by incorporating it into the
Fourteenth Amendment); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) (early
and crucial delineation of scope of federal power); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1819) (judicial review of state laws); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137 (1803) (judicial review of federal statutes).
21. Some states have enacted statutes prescribing a multicultural curriculum. See
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 15.41173 (Callaghan 1987) ("The appropriate authorities of a
public school of the state shall give special attention and consideration to the degree to
which instructional materials that reflect our society, either past or present, including
social studies textbooks, reflect the pluralistic, multiracial, and multiethnic nature of our
society, past and present. . . ."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-18a (West 1986)
("[E]ach local or regional board of education shall . . . select those (materials] which
accurately present the achievements and accomplishments of individuals and groups from
all ethnic and racial backgrounds and of both sexes."); NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-213(2)
(1994) ("[AIIl American history courses . . . shall include and adequately stress
contributions of all ethnic groups (a) to the development and growth of America into a
great nation, (b) to art, music, education, medicine, literature, science, politics, and
government, and (c) the war services in all wars of this nation.").
22. See Carol Gluck, History According to Whom? Let the Debate Continue, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 19, 1994, at A23.

1996]

ETHNOCENTRIC CURRICULUM INA MULTICULTURAL NATION

317

educators, and parents. 3 Today there is broad agreement among
scholars and educators that a multicultural approach to teaching United
States history, consistent with high standards of scholarship, accuracy, and
balance (admittedly a tall order), represents a marked improvement over
prior curriculum approaches that tended to exclude or minimize the roles
and contributions of racial and ethnic minorities and women.24
But while most can agree on multiculturalism in principle, few can
agree on what the concept means in practice. In many states, particularly
populous and ethnically diverse states such as New York and California,
multiculturalism has inspired a heated and at times vociferous debate on
culture, ethnicity, and the very meaning and purpose of teaching history
in the public schoolsY Textbooks are now scrutinized for passages that
are insensitive or offensive to one or another ethnic group and for
adequate treatment of issues of particular ethnic concern.' Curriculum
offerings are under constant review in an effort to effectuate the optimal
balance between American history and the history of various regions of
the world, and among the various subjects and chronological periods of
American history.27
The process is largely a healthy one and, it could be argued, the very
essence of democracy. A multiethnic nation is struggling quite literally
to define itself-and is doing so through school board elections, public
The debate, for the most part, is
hearings and on-going dialogue.'
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." 29
And yet, like most political processes, the public debate on
multiculturalism carries with it certain hazards. Because both race and
education are central to the American experience, the consequences of bad
policy outcomes from the multiculturalism debate will be politically
23. See Robert Reinhold, Class Struggle: Cowgirls and the Bantu Migration:In Its
ControversialNew Textbooks, California is Rewriting History, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 26; Sam Howe Verhovek, Plan to EmphasizeMinority Cultures
Ignites a Debate, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1991, at Al.

24. See Verhovek, supra note 23.
25. See Reinhold, supra note 23, at 27-29; Verhovek, supra note 23, at B4. See
also ONE NATION, supra note 14.
26. See Reinhold, supra note 23, at 46.

27. See id.
28. See Gluck, supra note 22. Indeed an observer of the American political scene
may note with regret that so few other pressing political and social issues receive the
same intense level of public discussion as does the debate of multiculturalism in the
public schools.
29. These famous words of Justice Brennan are often invoked to indicate that the
political process safeguarded by the First Amendment is, in fact, working. See New
York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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divisive and deeply felt. And because race and education occupy a central
position in American constitutional law,30 the consequences of bad policy
may have constitutional dimensions. Unfortunately, the debate already has
begun to produce its share of bad policy."
The rallying cry of multiculturalism began as a response to what has
come to be known as Eurocentrism-the under-representation of nonEuropean ethnic cultures in the public school curriculum.3 2 Yet under
the same rallying cry of multiculturalism, some scholars, educators, and
local school boards are advocating a new curriculum that may pass over
into an ethnocentrism of its own. 3 In fact, some black leaders and
educators now openly embrace ethnocentrism in the form of an educational
discipline or philosophy known as Afrocentrism.Y
Although many other racial and ethnic minorities are active 3in5
lobbying for curriculum that promotes their respective ethnic histories,
the Afrocentric education movement seems to represent a special case with
respect to the scope of its own ambitions and the controversy surrounding
some of its claims.3 6 For example, one black educator argues that a
comprehensive Afrocentric education for black public school children is
necessary because black children have different "learning styles" from
white children.37 Another black educator distinguishes between "skills
education" and "political education" and stresses the importance of the
latter over the former. 8 He further argues that, for black children,
"political education has to be a total quest for liberation[,]" which is
something "white society can't give [them]." 39 Consistent with this
thinking, a number of school boards in predominantly black inner cities
have established not merely Afrocentric courses or curriculum but entirely
separate public schools in which Afrocentric principles and subject matter
30. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. See infra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
32. See Andrew Hacker, Trans-NationalAmerica, in N.Y. REV. OF BooKs,
Nov. 22, 1990, at 19.

33. See Michel Marriott, Afrocentrism: Balancing or Skewing History?, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1991, § 1, at 1. See generally GOING TO SCHOOL: THE AFRICANAMERICAN EXPERIENCE (Kofi Lomotey ed., 1990) [hereinafter GOING TO SCHOOL].

34.
35.
36.
37.

See Marriott, supranote 33. See generally GOING TO SCHOOL, supra note 33.
See Reinhold, supra note 23, at 27-29.
See Marriott, supra note 33, § 1, at 18.
Dirk Johnson, Milwaukee CreatingTwo Schools ForBlack Boys, N.Y. TIMES,

Sept. 30, 1990, § 1, at 1, 26 (statement of Dr. Jawanza Kunjufu).
38. Kofi Lomotey, An Interview with Booker Peek, in GOING TO SCHOOL, supra
note 33, at 14-15.

39. Id.
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are emphasized throughout the school's curriculum.'
For example,
Milwaukee has established two "Schools of African American Immersion"
aimed primarily toward "at risk" black male students. 4
Another controversial aspect of the Afrocentric education movement
relates to some of the historical claims put forth by some scholars which,
in turn, have been incorporated into some Afrocentric teaching
materials.4' A collection of essays on African-American subjects
prepared for use in the public schools of Portland, Oregon credits ancient
Egyptians with paranormal powers such as spiritual healing and attributes
to Africa "fully and without qualification" the discovery of time; the
control and use of fire; the development of tool technology, language and
agriculture; the invention of advanced aeronautics, such as actual working
gliders; and the development of a theory of evolution.43 Gilbert T.
Sewall, editor of Social Studies Review, a professional publication, states
that "[s]ome of thei- claims [contained in the Portland essays] are false[]"
and "others cannot be verified."'
Another essay in the Portland
collection claims that Europe stole its civilization from Africa and then
engaged in malicious representation of African society and people as part
of a conspiracy.45 The Portland essays reportedly have become the
inspiration for Afrocentric curriculum in Milwaukee, Indianapolis,
Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Richmond, Atlanta, Philadelphia, Detroit,
Baltimore, Camden, and other cities. 46
Most disturbingly, some Afrocentric scholars and educators have
propounded the theory that blacks are a genetically superior race, and
have espoused this theory in some public schools, notably those of Atlanta
40. Milwaukee, Detroit and Seattle have established Afrocentric schools.

See

Constantine Angelos, School Faces Challenge of its Life, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 21,
1993, at B1; Johnson, supra note 37; Thomas Toch, Afrocentric Schools: Fighting a

RacistLegacy, U.S. NEWS & VORLD REP., Dec. 9, 1991, at 74; Laurel S. Walters, The
Plight of Black Male Schools, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sept. 9, 1991, at 8.
41. See generally Steven Siegel, Race, Education and the Equal Protection Clause
in the 1990s: The Meaning of Brown v. Board of Education Re-Examined in Light of
Milwaukee's Schools of African-American Immersion, 74 MARQ. L. REv. 501 (1991).
42. Michel Marriott, As a Discipline Advances, A Debate on Scholarship, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 11, 1991, § 1, at 18.

43. See Bernard R. Ortiz de Montellano,

Melanin, Afrocentricity, and

Pseudoscience, in 1993 YEARBOOK OF PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 36-55 (1993) (noting
Hunter H. Adams's textbook, AFRICAN AND AFRICAN-AMERICAN CONTRIBUTIONS IN

SCIENCE (1990)).
44. Marriott, supra note 42, at 18 (statement of Gilbert T. Sewall, editor of Social
Studies Review).
45. See Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43, at 36-37.
46. SCHLESINGER, supra note 9, at 35-36.
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This theory of inherent racial superiority is based on the

fact that blacks possess a higher concentration of melanin-a component
of skin pigmentation-than other races, and that a high concentration of

melanin supposedly makes possible superior mental and cognitive
abilities.' The scientific basis for the Afrocentric theory of melanism
has been largely discredited

49

However, even if melanism has at least

some basis in science, the teaching of this theory or any theory of inherent
racial superiority5" as fact has no place in the public schools."'
Most Afrocentric scholarship is not false, misleading or racist, but, as

the above examples demonstrate, there is cause for concern over what
might be termed "radical Afrocentric curriculum" which appears
motivated by rhetorical or ideological purposes. The reasons for such
47. See Leon Jaroff, Teaching Reverse Racism, TIME, Apr. 4, 1994, at 74-75.
48. Id.
49. Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43.
50. Although theories asserting a scientific basis for claims of inherent white racial
superiority have had a long and dishonorable history in this country, I am not aware of
any reported instance in which such theories have been expressly incorporated into the
public school curriculum. See generally STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF

MAN (1981). However, it is worth noting that a widely-publicized, bestselling book
published in 1994 entitled The Bell Curve makes the claim that intelligence as measured
by IQ testing is "substantially inheritable," and that the lower average IQ scores of
blacks as compared to whites and Asians suggest that blacks, on average, are biologically
inferior in intelligence to other racial groups. RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES
MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLIGENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE

298-315 (1994) [hereinafter THE BELL CURVE]. Hermstein and Murray also suggest that
government intervention, including public education, is largely ineffective in helping to
raise the performance and life prospects of those that do not perform well on intelligence
tests. Id. at 436-45. In view of this claim, and leaving aside for a moment other moral,
legal and scientific considerations, it would be profoundly ironic and even conceptually
incoherent if Hermstein and Murray's perspectives were incorporated into the curriculum
of a public school. Yet given the wide attention accorded The Bell Curve, it is perhaps
not too soon to raise the question of whether the teaching of Hermstein's and Murray's
theory of modem eugenics as fact in a high school biology or social studies class would
offend the Constitution. Thus, Hermstein and Murray's theory of eugenics and the
Afrocentric theory of melanism are treated together, infra Part II.B, in which I propose
a constitutional standard that proscribes the teaching of doctrines of inherent racial
superiority as fact in the public schools.
51. See infra notes 123-63 and accompanying text.
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excesses in the public school curriculum are cogently described by
historian Arthur Schlesinger:
Like other excluded groups before them, black Americans
invoke supposed past glories to compensate for real past and
present injustices. Because their exclusion has been more tragic
and terrible than that of white immigrants, their quest for selfaffirmation [has been] more intense and passionate. .
[D]octrinaire ethnicity in general and the dogmatic black version
in particular raise questions that deserve careful and dispassionate
examination.52
Schlesinger does not -specify precisely who should undertake the
careful and dispassionate examination. In the following pages I will argue
that it may be appropriate and indeed desirable for the judiciary to
undertake this examination in cases in which doctrinaire ethnicity appears
to implicate core constitutional values.

III.

JUDICIAL REvIEw OF RADICAL ETHNOCENTRIC CURRICULUM:
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

Although judicial review of radical ethnocentric curriculum could be
characterized as a major expansion of judicial power, so too can it be
characterized as operating largely within the confines of existing Supreme
Court authority. This is true because the subject matter lies peculiarly at
the nexus of several of the most important strands of constitutional
jurisprudence. These strands, despite recent changes in the Supreme
Court's composition and outlook, retain their essential vitality.
What follows is decidedly not a new program for comprehensive
judicial oversight of the schools. It is rather a more limited proposal for
judicial review of three discrete failures of educational policy-making, all
of which are associated with ethnocentric curriculum. These policy
failures, examples of which were provided in the preceding section, may
be described for our present purposes asfirst, secular educational material
that the state asserts is true but, in fact, is demonstrably false; second, the
teaching of theories of inherent racial superiority as fact; and third, the
establishment of schoolwide ethnocentric curriculum that promotes racial
segregation. As will be shown, each of these policy failures represents a
threat to core constitutional values and, as such, are appropriate subjects
for judicial review.

52. SCHLESINGER, supra note 9, at 36, 38-39.
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A. The Constitution Prohibits the State From Teaching

CurricularMaterial Which the State Asserts is
True But Which, in Fact, is Demonstrably False

1. Sources of Authority
In this section I argue that the Constitution prohibits the state from

teaching curricular material which the state asserts is true but which is
demonstrably false.

For purposes of this discussion I assume that the

curricular material in question is not clearly religious in nature and
therefore such teaching would not otherwise implicate the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause. 3 In formulating a standard I look
to the First Amendment's free speech guarantee and to the branch of
substantive due process recognized in Meyer v. NebraskaY This well-

settled authority provides a firm foundation for the principle that
government cannot teach secular curricular material and assert that such
material is true when, in fact, the material is patently false.

53. It is, of course, true that the boundary of subject matter implicated by the
Establishment Clause is not well-defined. See, e.g., Anita Bowser, Delimiting Religion
in the Constitution:A ClassificationProblem, 11 VAL. U. L. REV. 163 (1977); George
C. Freeman III, The Misguided Search for the ConstitutionalDefinition of "Religion,"
71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Note, Toward a ConstitutionalDefinition of Religion, 91
HARV.L. REv. 1056 (1978). Nevertheless, although some curricular material that the
state claims is true, but which is demonstrably false, could be clearly implicated by the
Establishment Clause (for example, a claim that human beings appeared only 5000 years
ago and that such appearance resulted from "instantaneous creation," see Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,591 n.11 (1987)), other material may well be implicated by my
proposed standard but fall outside the subject matter traditionally associated with the
Establishment Clause. For example, a textbook used in many public schools contains the
assertion that ancient Egyptians were "psychotronic engineers" who were endowed with
powers of extrasensory perception. See Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43, at 47-52.
See also supranotes 43-46 and accompanying text and infra note 120. Significantly, the
school textbook itself characterizes the above claim as based on science. Id. Under
these circumstances, it would be inappropriate to classify the subject matter of the claim
as "religious" and subject the claim to Establishment Clause analysis. Moreover, some
demonstrably false claims could be expected to fall clearly outside the subject matter
previously recognized by the Supreme Court as "religious" within the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. In my view, selective expansion of the Establishment Clause to
reach these allegedly scientific claims contained in curricular material is less desirable
than the recognition of a clear constitutional principle that the state may not teach
curricular material that it asserts is true, but which is demonstrably false.
54. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
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a. The Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment
Over the past seventy years the Supreme Court has transformed the
First Amendment into a powerful shield against government control over

individual thought, belief, and expression. The First Amendment's free
speech guarantees extend to those who seek to overthrow the
government" to those who release confidential information that may
significantly disrupt the government,5 6 to those who burn the American
flag as a form of protest, 7 to nude dancers," to lawyers, 9 even to
convicted felons.'
Notwithstanding this broad reach, the First
Amendment's Free Speech Clause has been applied sparingly and
inconsistently to a realm declared by the Supreme Court to be a "symbol
of our democracy[,] . . . the most pervasive means for promoting our
common destiny[,]" 6 and a place where "[t]he vigilant protection of

[our] constitutional freedom[- is nowhere more vital

.

" 62

That

paradoxical realm is the public school classroom.

Although the Supreme Court has held that students do not "shed their

constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate[,]" 63 in practice, the

public school classroom in general (as distinct from other school programs
and activities such as, for example, the school library)' and secular
curriculum in particular have been a virtual constitutional black hole in
which government has been accorded nearly complete license to practice
55. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (holding that suppression of
speech or the press is unconstitutional unless the speech or publication creates a "clear
and present danger" to the security of the United States government).
56. New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). Justice Black wrote
that it would make a "shambles of the First Amendment" to enjoin the publication of a
newspaper unless the government met the heavy burden of justifying its restraint. Id. at
714-715.
57. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
58. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
59. Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (permitting certain types of
lawyer advertising). See Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 115 S. Ct. 2371 (1995)
(applying heightened scrutiny standard under the First Amendment's commercial speech
doctrine to uphold 30 day waiting period for attorney direct mail solicitation).
60. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
61. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
62. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960).
63. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
64. See Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion) (stating that
school boards may not remove books from school libraries for reasons that violate
students' First Amendment right to receive information).
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Perhaps only in this

realm could a statute survive judicial scrutiny when such statute prohibits
material which "'speaks slightingly of the founders of the republic ... or
which belittles or undervalues their work.'"'

There are, of course, compelling reasons for the seemingly anomalous
treatment of public school secular curriculum. First, the purpose of public
education is the "inculcat[ion] [of] fundamental values necessary to the
maintenance of a democratic political system ...
."67 It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for government to fulfill this function in the
elementary and secondary schools without practicing content and
viewpoint discrimination. Second, education in this country traditionally
has been controlled by local, elected school boards which presumably are
uniquely well-situated to devise a curriculum that reflects and distills these
fundamental values. 8 Judicial review of the public school secular
curriculum-even if limited to subject matter that directly implicates core
constitutional values-raises the specter of a transfer of ultimate curricular
authority from elected school boards to judges who are neither experts in
65. Cf. Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding unconstitutional
the compulsory flag salute and Pledge of Allegiance in public schools). The Barnette
Court used sweeping language to indicate the constitutional infirmity of compelled
speech:
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no
official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess
by word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit
an exception, they do not now occur to us.
Id. at 642. Ironically, it could be argued that elementary and secondary education
consists in large part of compelled speech, albeit in a considerably more subtle and less
draconian form than that embodied in the flag salute and pledge. Notwithstanding the
Barnette Court's sweeping language condemning the prescription of "what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion or other matters of opinion," the Barnette rule
against compelled speech in the public schools has never been directly applied to any
other aspect of public school curriculum, pedagogy or activity. So although Justice
Jackson could not think of an "exception" to the rule against compelled speech in the
public schools, it turns out that the Barnette flag salute rule is itself an exception to the
general rule that the state may prescribe what is orthodox in its curriculum. Id.
66. Johnsonv. Stuart, 702 F.2d 193, 194 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting OR. REV. STAT.
§ 337.260 (1981)). The court only reached the issue of the plaintiff's standing to sue and
the provision apparently was never litigated on the merits.
67. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979).
68. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 891-92 (1982) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).

1996]

ETHNOCENTRC CURRICULUM INA MULTICULTURAL NATION

325

pedagogy nor necessarily responsive to the needs and aspirations of the
community. 61
Notwithstanding these generally compelling prudential considerations,
it can be argued that judicial review under the First Amendment of
curriculum that is demonstrably false may be appropriate and necessary,
and comports with existing Supreme Court authority.' 0
A state's
communication of false information to public school students violates the
students' First Amendment freedoms of speech, inquiry, and (nonreligious) belief' as well as the right to receive information.'
Under
these circumstances, judicial review is appropriate because courts have a
duty to intervene in secular educational matters when basic constitutional
values are directly and sharply implicated 3 in order to "safeguard the
fundamental values of freedom of speech and inquiry and of belief."'
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged the special role of
the public schools in preparing youth for citizenship and full participation
in a democratic society. The school is "a principal instrument in
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later
professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment."' The classroom is a "marketplace of ideas!]" and "[t]he
Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to
[these ideas]." 6 Given the special responsibility of the state to inculcate
youth,' it would be a breach of the state's responsibility and a threat to
core constitutional values embedded in the First Amendment78 and in the
69. Id. at 890-91.
70. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
71. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511

(1969).
72. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866-68 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753, 762-63 (1972); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
73. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968).

74. Id.
75. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
76. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
77. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1979) (citing Brown, 347 U.S. at
493).
78. "That they are educating the young for citizenship is reason for scrupulous
protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free
mind at its source and teach youth to discount important principles of our government
as mere platitudes." Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943).
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Constitution itself?9 if the state through its public schools communicated
information that is demonstrably false.
The Court's 1991 decision in Rust v. Sullivan' may raise a question
about the continuing vitality of constitutional limitations with respect to
government's choice of content in government-sponsored speech. In Rust,
the Court upheld federal regulations prohibiting abortion counseling in
connection with a federally financed family planning program,
notwithstanding the fact that the prohibition curtailed the speech of the
nonprofit health care organizations that receive funding under the program
as well as the staff of these organizations."' Such curtailment of speech
is constitutional, the Court noted, since the government may "make a
value judgment favoring [a] childbirth over abortion, and. . . implement
that judgment by the allocation of public funds."'
Read broadly and
without qualification, Rust may suggest that government has a free hand
in determining conditions of sponsorship of another's speech or the content
of government speech. Fortunately, the Rust Court expressly prohibits
such broad governmental discretion in cases in which government
"'discriminate[s] invidiously . . . in such a way as to ai[m] at the
suppression of. . . ideas. ' "' Moreover, Rust can be distinguished in
that it pertains to a speech resti'ction as a condition of receipt of
government funds;' in no sense can it be read as allowing government
to communicate demonstrably false information. Finally, Rust is about a
restriction on speech in the context of a government-funded family
planning program; its application to the public schools would be
inconsistent with the Court's repeated pronouncements with respect to the
constitutionally guaranteed academic freedom of teachers," the
constitutional right of students to receive information' and the special
responsibility vested in government to inculcate youth." In the school
79. "[A]nd secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity . . .
U.S. CONST. pmbl. (emphasis added).
80. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
81. Id. at 192-200.
82. Id. at 192-93 (citation omitted).
83. Id. at 192 (quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461
U.S. 540, 548 (1983); Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959)).
84. Id. at 192-200.
85. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979); Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 602-04 (1967).
86. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (plurality opinion)
(citations omitted); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citations omitted).
87. See, e.g., Ambach, 441 U.S. at 76-77.
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setting, Rust's "free hand" doctrine must give way to at least minimal
respect for these core constitutional values. The communication of
demonstrably false information to public schools violates these values.
b. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
In Meyer v. Nebraska,"8 the Supreme Court struck down a statute
forbidding the teaching of any language other than English before the
eighth grade.8 9 The Court based its decision on an expansive definition
of the liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process Clause:
Without doubt, [liberty] denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of [an] individual ... to acquire useful
knowledge . . . Determination by the legislature of what
constitutes proper exercise of police power is not final or
conclusive but is subject to supervision by the courts .... The
American people have always regarded education and acquisition
of knowledge as matters of supreme importance which should be
diligently promoted.' °
Although the substantive due process principles upon which Meyer was
based have been largely repudiated by the Court, 91 Meyer itself survives
as a crucial underpinning to the Court's modern substantive due process
jurisprudence. 2
The continuing vitality of Meyer was affirmed in Epperson v.
Arkansas93 in which the Court struck down on other grounds a statute
prohibiting the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools.'
Because the Epperson Court's decision rested on the Establishment
Clause,95 the Court noted that "[flor purposes of the present case, we
need not re-enter the difficult terrain [of Meyer] .... We need not take
88. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
89. Id.
90. Id.at 399-400 (citation omitted).
91. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMEmICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 15-6 (1978)
(discussing the decline of economic substantive due process).
92. See id.
93. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
94. Id. The Court struck down the law as a violation of the First Amendment's
mandate of government neutrality regarding religion, which is applied to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 109.

95. Id. at 106-09.
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advantage of the broad premise which the Court's decision in Meyer
furnishes .
"...96
Meyer also has been noted with approval in cases
ranging from the right of students to challenge a school board's removal
of books from the school library' to the right of married couples to use
birth control. 9
The broad powers of Meyer have remained largely dormant in the
school setting because subsequent decisions have been based largely on the
First Amendment, which was incorporated against the states four years
after Meyer was decided.'
Most school controversies capable of
resolution under Meyer are also capable of resolution under the First
Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech, inquiry and (non-religious)
belief, and the modem Court has.clearly preferred the latter jurisprudence
over the former."°° Yet, as noted0 above, the Court has never repudiated
the "broad premises" of Meyer.1 1
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court recently has applied Meyer's
useful knowledge standard in an important decision concerning public
school curriculum, although Meyer itself was not expressly acknowledged
in the decision because (one suspects) the curriculum dispute implicated
religious matters and (as was the case in Epperson v. Arkansas'0) the
Court felt more comfortable resting its decision exclusively in the
Establishment Clause. In Edwards v. Aguillard 3 the Court struck down
a Louisiana statute forbidding the -teaching of the theory of evolution
unless accompanied by instruction in the theory of "creation science."
The Court determined that the purpose of the law was not secular, 104 a
finding sufficient to invalidate the law under Establishment Clause
96. Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
97. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 863 (1982) (plurality opinion).
98. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).

99. See Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927).

100. See TRIBE, supra note 91.
101. See id. Even the present members of the Court who have repudiated the

furthest extension of modem substantive due process-the right to an abortion recognized
in Roe v. Wade-continue to regard Meyer v. Nebraska as a significant and valid
exemplar of substantive due process. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting,joined in part by White, Scalia,

and Thomas, JJ.). Justice Scalia, who has most consistently and forcefully argued for
a narrow view of substantive due process, has referred to Meyer v. Nebraska as "an
established part of our constitutional jurisprudence." Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S.
110, 121 (1989) (Scalia, J.).

102. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
103. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
104. Id. at 585-86.
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principles."°5 This determination of legislative purpose derived in large

measure from a statement of the statute's sponsor, who declared that his
"preference would be that neither creationism nor evolution"

be

taught. 106 The Court expressly condemned this statement because "such

a ban on teaching does not promote-indeed, it undermines-the provision

of a comprehensive scientific education." 1 7 The Court's conclusion can
be fairly characterized as an application of the "useful knowledge"
standard at a crucial stage in its analysis of the constitutionality of a state
law governing curricular content in the public schools.
The constitutionally
guaranteed right "to acquire useful
knowledge""'8 implies not merely that the state is prohibited from
unduly restricting an entire sphere of useful knowledge from the schools
(for example, teaching foreign languages before the eighth grade or

teaching the theory of evolution as part of a comprehensive scientific
education) but also that the state is prohibited from affirmatively diffusing

material that is not "useful knowledge."

For this formulation to fall

within prudential bounds and not transform courts into super-boards of

education,"

a court's ability to pass on material that is not useful

knowledge should be limited strictly to educational material that the state
asserts is true but, in fact, is demonstrably false. Such materials, by
definition, cannot be defended as useful knowledge where the sphere is
public education and the speaker is the state itself."'
105. In order for a statute to survive an Establishment Clause challenge, "the statute
must have a secular legislative purpose; ... its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; .. .[and it] must not foster 'an excessive
government entanglement with religion.'" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613
(1971) (citations omitted). In Edwards, the Court determined that the Louisiana statute
was inconsistent with the first of the three Lemon principles, a determination that was
sufficient to invalidate the statute. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 594. The continuing vitality
of the Lemon principles is in doubt. See Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2655 (1992)
(acknowledging that the Court remains deeply divided on the continuing vitality of the
Lemon principles, but leaving reconsideration of these principles to another day).
106. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 587 (quoting Senator Keith).
107. Id.
108. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
109. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515
(1969) (Black, J., dissenting); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 885 (1982)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting).
110. C. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,271-73 (1964). (holding that
the First Amendment protects speech concerning public officials notwithstanding such
speech contains factual errors). The New York Times doctrine applies to private
speakers, not the state itself. See infra note 146 for a discussion of the special category
of speech that has been termed "government speech." See infra note 153 for a
discussion of the complex and unsettled question of whether classroom speech of public
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2. The Standard as Applied
There are those who may argue that a court is not technically
competent to enforce a standard prohibiting the state from teaching
curricular material which the state asserts is true but which is
demonstrably false. In fact, courts are often called upon to make
qualitative judgments concerning the reliability of expert claims in the
different but analogous context of evidentiary determinations under
Federal Rule of Evidence 702."' If anything, judicial determinations of
scientific validity under Rule 702 ordinarily could be expected to draw
upon far more difficult and complex technical subject matter because most
disputes arising under Rule 702 turn on whether to admit into evidence
"novel" scientific information or techniques." 2 By contrast, a standard
of demonstrable falsity implies consideration of well-established rather
than novel scientific propositions, because the latter propositions, by their
very nature, will seldom be either demonstrably true or demonstrably
false. This distinction was recognized in the leading Supreme Court
decision construing Rule 702:
Although the Frye decision [Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)] focused exclusively on "novel" scientific
techniques, we do not read the requirements of Rule 702 to apply
school teachers should properly be accorded some First Amendment protection
notwithstanding the fact that the teachers in this setting are undoubtedly state actors for
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even assuming definitive resolution of this
question in the affirmative, First Amendment principles would provide little support for
a teacher to assert that particular curricular material is true when such material is, in
fact, demonstrably false. See supra notes 71-79 and accompanying text. Moreover, my
proposed standard of demonstrable falsity would, in practice, substantially comport with
the New York Times standard of "actual malice" (assuming the latter standard applies at
all to the classroom speech of public school teachers and assuming further that the
teacher's speech implicates the subject matter protected by such standard); that is, a
teacher who asserted that particular curricular material is true when such material is
demonstrably false would almost certainly be found to have made such assertion with
"knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
111. FED. R. EvID. 702 provides "[ilf scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact
in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." Id.
112. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796
n.11 (1993) (stating that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, "well-established
propositions are less likely to be challenged than those that are novel.").
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specially or exclusively to unconventional evidence. Of course,
well-established propositions are less likely to be challenged than
those that are novel, and they are more handily defended.
Indeed, theories that are so firmly established as to have attained
the status of scientific law, such as the laws of thennodynamics,
properly are subject to judicial notice under Fed. Rule Evid.
201.113
In most cases, a curriculum review standard of demonstrable falsity could
be expected to comport with the standard governing judicial notice under
Federal Rule of Evidence 201 in that proof of demonstrable falsity would
usually require reliance on facts which are "capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be
questioned."" 4 Put another way, a standard of demonstrable falsity
requires proving the negative of the disputed proposition, which is usually
possible only if an inconsistent proposition is demonstrably true and, if so,
the latter proposition is usually of a type capable of being judicially
noticed under Rule 201.115 For these reasons, the proposed curriculum
review standard as applied could be expected to implicate only the most
extreme and unsupported claims," 6 and judicial decision-making under
the standard would be well within the experience and technical competence
of the judiciary.
It may be instructive to apply the proposed standard to an example of
curricular material developed by those espousing radical ethnocentric
views. An Afrocentric textbook incorporated into the curriculum of the
public schools of Atlanta, Detroit, Portland, and Washington, D.C.,
113. Id. (emphasis added).
114. FED. R. EVID. 201(b).
115. The inconsistent proposition capable of being judicially noticed would most
likely be "theories that are so firmly established as to have attained the status of scientific
law." Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796 n.11. See infra note 120 and accompanying text for
an enumeration of scientific theories that are flatly inconsistent with certain scientific
claims made by various Afrocentric scholars, including claims in Hunter H. Adams's
African and African-American Contributionsin Science (1990), a text used in the public
schools of Atlanta, Detroit, Portland, Washington, D.C. and several other major cities
in the United States.
116. For example, a standard of demonstrable falsity, supported by well-established
scientific theory, would be sufficient, in all likelihood, to implicate Adams's claim that
ancient Egyptians had "psychotronic engineers" who were endowed with powers of
extrasensory perception. Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43, at 47-49 (citing Adams's
claims of psychic powers held by ancient Africans). See infra notes 118 & 120 and
accompanying text.
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among other cities,1 7 states without clear attribution that ancient
Egyptians had "psychotronic engineers" who were endowed with powers

of extrasensory perception." 8 This curricular material has no apparent
basis in science,"' and cannot be said to "promote

. .

. a comprehensive

scientific education" within the meaning of Edwards.-o In the face of
curricular material of this nature and in light of the failure of state or local
school authorities to remedy these clear lapses in educational judgment,
the judiciary should step into the breach and enforce the constitutional
principles articulated in Meyer and Edwards.' Alternatively, a court

may rely on constitutional principles grounded exclusively in the First
Amendment, such as a student's First Amendment right to receive

information.
B. The Constitution Prohibits the State From Teaching

Theories of Inherent Racial Superiority as Fact
In this section I argue that the Constitution proscribes teaching
theories of inherent racial superiority as fact in public schools. I contend

that this constitutional standard as applied would implicate two theories of
117. Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43, at 36.
118. See id. at 47-49 (citing Adams's textbook).
119. Bernard Ortiz de Montellano assessed the scientific validity of some of the
claims made by various Afrocentric scholars, including those made in Adams's African
andAfrican-American Contributionsin Science. See supra note 43; see also supranotes
42-46, 112-13 and accompanying text. Referring to the claims of Adams and others that
ancient Egyptians and other African peoples possessed powers of extrasensory
perception, which, among other things, enabled them to make astronomical discoveries
without telescopes and to predict the future, Ortiz de Montellano states:
There is no physical evidence for the existence of ESP or psychic powers.
Their existence, in fact, would violate several fundamental principles of
physics.

Rothman . . . points out that ESP would violate the Lorentz

Invariance, i.e., that nothing can travel faster than light, and the Principle of
Causality, i.e., that a cause must always come before its effect. Sirius is more
than 8 light years away. In the case of an Egyptian oracle, either the psychic
energy and the information would have to travel almost instantaneously, clearly
violating the Lorentz Invariance, or the question and its answer would require
16 earth years to do the round trip even if they traveled at the speed of light.
*.. Furthermore, parapsychologists claim that there is no diminution in signal
strength with distance, despite the Inverse Square Law, another principle of
physics that requires a diminution of a force by a factor equal to the square of
the distance from its source.
Ortiz de Montellano, supra note 43, at 49.
120. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 587 (1987).
121. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
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inherent racial superiority that have gained wide notoriety: the Afrocentric
theory of melanism'" and the theory of modern eugenics most
prominently articulated by Charles Murray and Richard Herrnstein in their

book The Bell Curve." The Afrocentric theory of melanism is already
being taught in some public schools, notably those of Atlanta and Detroit,

and Fort Lauderdale.124 Although I am not aware of any reported
instance of "modern eugenics" being taught in the public schools, the
extraordinary attention"z accorded to the subject resulting from the 1994
publication of The Bell Curve suggests that it is not too soon to raise the
question of whether the teaching of this subject as part of a high school
biology or social studies class would offend the Constitution.
It is important to make clear at the outset of this discussion that this
standard, to be consistent with the speech protective principles at the heart
of the First Amendment, must be exceedingly narrow.'11 Thus, the
standard seeks to exclude from the public school curriculum only the
teaching of a theory of inherent racial superiority as fact. This proposed
standard does not touch public higher education, where "inculcating
122. See supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.

123. See THE BELL CURVE, supra note 50.
124. See Jaroff, supra note 47, at 74-75.

125. See, e.g., The 'Bell Curve' Agenda, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 24, 1994, at A16;
Jason DeParle, DaringResearch or 'Social Science Pornography?',N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
9, 1994, § 6, at 48; Richard Lacayo, For Whom the Bell Curves, TIME, Oct. 24, 1994,
at 66; Charles Lane, The Tainted Sources of 'The Bell Curve,' N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS,
Dec. 1, 1994, at 14; Race & I.Q., THE NEW REP., Oct. 31, 1994, at 4-37 (a
compendium of critical responses to THE BELL CURVE, including pieces by Stanley
Crouch, Henry Louis Gates, Jr., Nathan Glazer, Andrew Hacker, Ann Hulbert, John
Judis, Randall Kennedy, Charles Lane, Michael Lind, Walter Lippman, Glenn Loury,
Richard Nisbett, Hugh Pearson, Martin Peretz, Dante Ramos, Jeffrey Rosen, Alexander
Star, Leon Wieseltier and Alan Wolfe); James Ridgeway, Behind the Curve: Tracing the
Roots of CharlesMurray's Race Management, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Nov. 15, 1994, at
15-16.
126. If the proposed standard were the result of a statute and not grounded in the
Constitution, it would be subject to the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines of the First
Amendment, which generally require that a statute be drawn with "narrow specificity,"
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963), so as not to chill constitutionally protected
speech. The proposed standard, which is grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment, does
not necessarily implicate the First Amendment's overbreadth and vagueness doctrines in
that a court could simply conclude that the principles underlying the Fourteenth
Amendment take precedence over those underlying the First Amendment. However, I
will argue that the proposed standard takes full account of countervailing First
Amendment principles. See infra notes 132, 150-63, 166-67, and accompanying text.
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fundamental values"" 2 is not the overriding educational mission and,
more importantly, the scope of educators' academic freedom is far broader
than that traditionally accorded teachers of elementary and secondary
schools.'2 The proposed standard also does not encompass a public

school teacher's out-of-class writings, speeches or political
association. 29 The standard does not seek to implicate a teacher's mere
use of a racial epithet even if motivated by racial animus, although such
use of an epithet may be subject to sanction on other grounds. 130
Finally, the standard does not necessarily preclude any curricular

treatment or classroom discussion of doctrines of inherent racial
superiority, as long as the curriculum or the teacher
does not maintain that
3
such doctrines are to be accepted as "fact." '

127. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 77 (1979). The inculcation of fundamental
values is the object of elementary and secondary schools, not of higher education.
128. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (need
for open-ended inquiry in university renders unconstitutional statute that prohibits state
university employment of Communist Party members); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354
U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (need for open-ended inquiry in university renders unconstitutional
statute requiring oath of state loyalty). Gregory A. Clarick, Public School Teachers and
The FirstAmendment: Protectingthe Right to Teach, 65 N.Y.U. L. RV. 693, 718 n.151
(1990) ("The Supreme Court has focused on the need for open-ended inquiry at the
university level because it sees such toleration as the fount of valuable scholarship.")
(emphasis added). By contrast, the Court has never applied this rationale of academic
freedom to elementary and secondary schools.
129. See, e.g., Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992) (upholding First
Amendment right of a white university professor to express racist views against blacks
in published writings); Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205,
391 U.S. 563, 565 (1968) (upholding First Amendment right of a teacher to criticize the
administrative and budgetary practices of his public employer in an editorial published
in a local newspaper).
130. Words that "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate
breach of the peace" are not constitutionally protected. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). Even if a teacher directed an abusive remark to a student that
would not be considered a "fighting word" within the meaning of Chaplinsky, school
administrators should be able to discipline a teacher who makes this type of remark,
especially if clearly irrelevant to the subject matter of instruction. See, e.g., Martin v.
Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 586 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that a college teacher had no First
Amendment right to use profane language in the classroom, because it "constituted a
deliberate superfluous attack on a 'captive audience' with no academic purpose or
justification.").
131. In formulating this standard, I considered and rejected a broader standard
which would have proscribed government advocacy or endorsement of a theory of racial
supremacy in the public schools. In my view, this broader standard would have raised
significant vagueness and overbreadth concerns, see supra note 128, and might thereby
chill a teacher's treatment of difficult and controversial subject matter. For example, a
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1. Sources of Authority
In fashioning a constitutional standard applicable to this difficult and
complex subject matter, it is appropriate to begin by noting the
inapplicability of my earlier proposed constitutional standard grounded in
the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause: that is, that the
Constitution prohibits the state from teaching curricular material which the
state asserts is true but which, in fact, is demonstrably false. For a
variety of scientific and epistemological reasons, a standard of
teacher subject to the broader standard might be reluctant to even mention various aspects
of slavery, the Jim Crow period, the Ku Klux Klan or other white supremacist
movements for fear that mere mention or discussion could be construed as advocacy or
endorsement. By contrast, the standard I adopt, proscribing only the teaching of theories
of inherent racial superiority as "fact," is narrowly tailored and abridges no more speech
than necessary. For purposes of the standard, the term "inherent" means a genetic or
biological basis for a particular alleged racial characteristic. Thus, a teacher who
compares or contrasts social or cultural traditions associated with various racial or ethnic
groups would not, without more, implicate the standard. Similarly, a teacher who
presents comparative social science data correlated by race or ethnicity would not,
without more, implicate the standard. An express reference to the genetic or biological
basis for the alleged difference would be necessary to bring the standard into play, and
even then the teacher would need to expressly characterize the genetic or biological basis
as "fact." By a teacher's express characterization of a theory of inherent racial
superiority as "fact," I mean a teacher's unqualified statement that the theory is true as
well as the teacher's omission of any substantial reference to competing claims made by
other relevant scientific theories that enjoy some degree of support within the scientific
community. For a more detailed discussion of the standard as applied to various types
of curricular material, see infra notes 164-179 and accompanying text.
I recognize that many subjects are routinely taught in the public schools and
presented as "facts" even if they do not meet the standard that I would apply in the
special case of theories of inherent racial superiority. For example, many conclusions
of social scientists may be presented as "fact" (especially in the less academically
rigorous environment of elementary and secondary schools as distinguished from higher
education) even if such conclusions represent only the best available thinking on the
subject and are not empirically proven (if that were even possible) or conclusions in
which statistical uncertainty is less than (say) five percent. Yet presentation of these
social science conclusions as "fact" does not necessarily offend legal, moral, or
educational norms. For an analogous treatment of the issue of certainty of scientific
knowledge in a different context, see FED. R. EvID. 702 and the standard governing the
admission in evidence of scientific knowledge set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-96 (1993) (holding that "general acceptance" by
the scientific community is not a necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific
evidence in the federal courts). See also supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
However, in the special case of theories of inherent racial superiority, I argue that the
Constitution requires a higher "burden of proof" before such material may be included
in the public school curriculum.
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demonstrable falsity does not generally lend itself to the subject matter
under consideration. Theories of inherent racial superiority-whether IQbased theories claiming white superiority or melanin theories claiming
black superiority-cannot be said to be demonstrably true or demonstrably
false in the same way that a claim concerning a recent historical event or
observable scientific phenomenon can be said to be demonstrably true or
false. The lack of certainty associated with theories of inherent racial
superiority arises in part because our current state of scientific knowledge
does not permit us to determine what proportion of intelligence is due 3to2
heredity and what proportion is due to environmental factors.
Moreover, with respect to theories of racial superiority based upon the IQ
measure of intelligence, such theories assume that there is such a thing as
quantifiable general intelligence; that IQ tests measure it accurately and
objectively; and that it is largely genetic, highly resistent to change and
unevenly distributed among the races.13
It may be that claims
concerning neuroscience, genetics, intelligence and population groups will
never be subject to a high degree of epistemological certainty because of
the number of extrinsic variables, the difficulties of measurement and the
problems of defining population groups." For all of these reasons, the
possibility of showing that a particular theory of inherent racial superiority
is not merely false, but demonstrably false, is remote. Thus, my earlier
proposed standard that prohibits the state from teaching curricular material
which is demonstrably false cannot be expected to be generally applicable
to this subject matter.
Although the teaching of a theory of inherent racial superiority as fact
in the public schools probably does not violate the substantive due process
principles of Meyer v. Nebraska35 or the First Amendment right to
receive information,' 6 such teaching nevertheless is inconsistent with other
key constitutional provisions. First, such teaching violates the Equal
Protection Clause in that the government through its curriculum is quite
132. The authors of The Bell Curve concede this point, but maintain that the genetic

component of intelligence is sufficiently important to affect an individual's life prospects
independent of environmental factors. See THE BELL CURVE, supranote 50, at 311-15.
133. See GOULD, supra note 50, at 146-233.
134. Id. at 322-23; see WILLIAM H. TUCKER, THE SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF
RACIAL RESEARCH 269-71 (1994). Because my purpose is only to show that theories of
inherent racial superiority are not demonstrably true or false, and that the essential

validity or non-validity of such theories are not subject to any overwhelming scientific
consensus, it is unnecessary to assess the scientific basis, if any, of each assumption
underlying the claims made by these theories.
135. 262 U.S. 390 (1923); see supra notes 89-111 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982) (plurality opinion);
see also supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
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literally making invidious race-based classifications in the absence of a
compelling state interest. 37

Alternatively, even if the mere act of

teaching theories of racial superiority in the public schools is not itself an
act of governmental race-based discrimination, it can be understood as a

government action which has a "significant tendency" to promote private
discrimination based upon race in violation of the Equal Protection

Clause. 3 ' Finally, the teaching of racial superiority can be understood

as violating a central purpose of public education itself,
which the
39
Supreme Court has accorded a constitutional dimension. 1
a. The Equal Protection Clause

The teaching of a theory of racial superiority as fact in the public
schools can be fairly characterized as a race-based classification by

government, which is generally forbidden by the Equal Protection
Clause,"

interest.' 4 '

unless such an act can be supported by a compelling state

Moreover, the prevention of racial discrimination in

education is a special concern of the Equal Protection Clause, 4 2 and the
137. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); United
States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also infra notes 141-49
and accompanying text.
138. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973); see infra note 149.
139. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
140. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
141. I would argue that in this context a compelling state interest would arise only
if a theory of inherent racial superiority were shown to be demonstrably true or
supported by an overwhelming consensus of the scientific community. In that event, the
compelling state interest would be the "truth" of the theory, and, under those
circumstances, the teaching of the theory in the public schools would be constitutionally
permissible. However, as I noted earlier, the current state of scientific knowledge on
this subject provides scant support for any theory of inherent racial superiority and,
moreover, the subject matter itself resists and probably precludes a high degree of
epistemological certainty at any time in the future because of the number of extrinsic
variables, the difficulties of measurement and the problems of defining population
groups. See supra text accompanying notes 134-36.
142. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593 (1983) ("[R]acial
discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well
as rights of individuals."). In fact, the Supreme Court determined in a rare instance in
which it was compelled to rank constitutional obligations, that the government's duty to
counter racism in education is even more important than the government's duty to
disassociate itself from religion in education. Thus, the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits the government from loaning textbooks to racially discriminating private schools
but not to private religious schools. Compare Norwood, 431 U.S. at 471 with Board of
Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248 (1968).
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proposed proscription of the teaching of racial superiority as fact in the
public schools is a necessary and appropriate extension of that concern.
143
The Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education,

narrowly construed, may stand only for the unconstitutionality of statesponsored racially segregated public schools, but it is worth recalling that
the decision was premised, to a great extent, inthe expressive element of
the forbidden conduct. The "message" of racial segregation was white
supremacy and black inferiority, and it was this message that led the Court
to conclude that separate schools were inherently unequal and violative of
the Equal Protection Clause." If this implicit message expressed by the
143. 347 U.s. 483 (1954).
144. "To separate [black students] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Id. at 494 (emphasis added). The State's teaching of racial superiority as fact would
presumably generate a feeling of inferiority to the disfavored race in a much more direct
and literal way. See also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (striking down state
miscegenation statute on equal protection grounds in part because the legislative purpose
in enacting such statutes was "an endorsement of the doctrine of 'White Supremacy'")
(emphasis added). For further discussion of Brown's antidiscrimination principle and its
close connection to the expressive element of de jure racial segregation, see Charles R.
Lawrence M1,If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990
DUKE L.J. 431,438-44 (1990). Professor Lawrence states: "Brown held that segregated
schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the message segregation conveys-the
notion that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with white
children. Segregation serves its purpose by conveying an idea .... Therefore, Brown
may be read as regulating the content of racist speech [in the sphere of public
education]." Id. at 439-40. Professor Lawrence's theory of Brown is fundamentally
sound, but his application of the theory to "racist speech" by students and faculty in
public universities is dangerously overbroad. Id., at 449-57. See Nadine Strossen,
Regulating Racist Speech on Campus:A Modest Proposal?,1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (1990).
It might be argued that Brown supports a standard that prohibits teaching theories
of inherent racial superiority as fact only when the theory disfavors African-Americans.
But even teaching a theory that the black race is genetically endowed with certain
superior mental and cognitive abilities relative to other races (for example, the
Afrocentric theory of melanism) could be said to offend a major premise of Brown itself,
that is, Brown's view of education as a "foundation of good citizenship" and as "a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values." Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
These educational purposes are directly undercut by the State teaching a theory of
inherent racial superiority as fact, regardless of which race is favored or disfavored. See
infra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the selective proscription of theories of inherent racial superiority based
upon their content (and keeping in mind that these theories generally can be said to be
neither demonstrably true nor false) would also offend the First Amendment, assuming
that the speech in question can be characterized as private speech (for example, teachers'
speech, which enjoys some degree of First Amendment protection notwithstanding
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segregated schools of, for example, Topeka, Kansas in 1954 had also been
made explicit through the adoption of curriculum that advocated white
supremacy or other racist doctrine, it would be hard to imagine how such
curriculum would not have been struck down by the Brown Court without
so much as changing a word of the Court's opinion as written.
Even if one chooses not to accept this concededly expansive
interpretation of Brown, it would be difficult to avoid the conclusion that
the Equal Protection Clause's clear proscription of government conduct
supporting invidious racial discrimination does not also implicate
government speech4 5 supporting the same forbidden purpose."v
By
teachers' status as government employees). See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377, 383-84 (1992) (holding that government may proscribe certain categories of speech
but, in doing so, may not engage in content discrimination within the category of
proscribable speech).
145. The Supreme Court has expressly recognized a category of speech it calls
"government speech" and has determined that this category lies wholly outside of the
First Amendment. See Board of Educ. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 250 (1990) ("[Tlhere is a crucial difference between government speech
endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, andprivatespeech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect."). Although
Mergens arose in the context of the First Amendment's religious clauses, there is no
reason to believe that the Court's simple classification of speech as either governmental
or private does not apply in other contexts as well. Professor Nadine Strossen, in
discussing the constitutional issues raised by campus "hate speech" codes, would
preserve the Mergens classification of speech and recalibrate the countervailing
constitutional interests as follows: "Paraphrasing [the Mergens] language and applying
it to the campus hate speech context, one could say, 'There is a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing racism, which the Equal Protection Clause forbids,
and private speech endorsing racism, which the Free Speech Clause protects.'".
Strossen, supra note 145, at 545. Professor Strossen also acknowledges, however, that
her general formulation as applied to the speech of public university faculty members
would require further modification in order to recognize their free speech rights
notwithstanding their status as government employees. Id. at 506 n.103.
146. It is true that the Supreme Court has never expressly held that the Equal
Protection Clause is applicable to government speech. However, the Court has made the
conceptual leap from the proscription of conduct to the proscription of speech in other
contexts, including those in which the First Amendment is more clearly and directly
applicable. For example, the Court has held, in an entirely different legal context, that
the government may proscribe private discrimination in the workplace even though such
discrimination contains elements of speech as well as conduct. See, e.g., Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (recognizing Title VII claim based on sexual
harassment causing a hostile workplace environment with no consideration of First
Amendment issues). The fact that the proposed standard proscribing the teaching of
inherent racial superiority as fact has a constitutional rather than statutory basis and
implicates government rather than private action would seem to provide an even stronger
foundation upon which this standard may implicate certain forms of speech as well as
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analogy, First Amendment jurisprudence teaches speech and conduct are

part of a continuum of action.

47

Thus, in the same way that First

Amendment jurisprudence is centered on the protection of speech but may

on occasion extend its protection to conduct when such conduct is imbued
with an expressive element; so Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence that
is centered on the proscription of discriminatory governmental conduct

may extend its proscription to certain forms of speech (that is,
discriminatory speech attributable to the government itself) when the
speech is imbued with an expressive element identical to that conveyed by

the prohibited conduct. It would be logically inconsistent for a court to
conclude otherwise. 48

b. The First Amendment
Of course, the recognition of a Fourteenth Amendment right to be free

of certain racially discriminatory government speech may lead inevitably
to a conflict between the First and Fourteenth Amendments in individual

cases.' 49 This is so, even though, at least in theory, government speech
conduct. If teacher in-class speech is understood as private speech and not government
speech, Meritor and other Title VII decisions are even more applicable to the legal
context under consideration. See infra note 153 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning of an American
flag is symbolic speech); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969) (wearing of a black armband by public school students is symbolic speech);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning of a draft card is symbolic
speech).
148. Even if it could be argued that teaching a theory of inherent racial superiority
as fact is neither government conduct nor speech amountingto a race-basedclassification
proscribed by the Equal Protection Clause, such teaching could be viewed alternately as
a government action having "significant tendency" to promote private discrimination
based upon race and therefore would violate the Equal Protection Clause on this ground
alone. See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 466 (1973). In Norwood, the Supreme
Court held a government program was unconstitutional because it aided private schools
which racially discriminated. The Court emphasized that the government may not
indirectly promote racial discrimination even if the government itself is not a party to
such discrimination. See id. The state's teaching of theories of inherent racial
superiority as fact would undoubtedly promote private acts of racial discrimination.
149. The fact that the proposed standard may, in particular cases, require a court
to balance the conflicting requirements of the First and Fourteenth Amendments is not
necessarily fatal to its establishment. On the contrary, a court may simply decide that
the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment take precedence over those of the First
(as distinguished from a situation in which there is a conflict between the First
Amendment and a statute, in which a court is required to conclude that the First
Amendment takes precedence over the statute, unless the latter is in furtherance of a
compelling state interest).
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(that is, speech attributed to government itself as distinct from speech
attributed to a government employee such as a teacher, who may retain a
right of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment independent of,
or even arising out of, the employer-employee relationship) lies wholly
outside the domain of the First Amendment. 5 ' But, as a practical
matter, one would expect that a court's determination of the threshold
question of attribution of the action to the government will turn on the
nature of the action: if the action is conduct rather than speech, the court
will more likely attribute the action to the government because many types
of government conduct can be clearly understood as the product of official
consideration and ratification. Conversely, if the action is primarily
speech, in the sense of the spoken word, such action by definition
originates in an individual who may or may not be an agent of the state.
Moreover, even if the individual may be regarded as an agent of the state
for some purposes, he may not necessarily be regarded as an agent of the
state for purposes of the particular speech under consideration.15'
Speech by its very nature tends to be a spontaneous act of an individual
and, as such, is often more difficult to be characterized as the product of
government action or ratification.
The foregoing considerations apply with special force to the public
education setting, in particular classroom teaching, where the concept of
academic freedom has been enshrined in the First Amendment,
notwithstanding the fact that a public school teacher in her official capacity
is undoubtedly a "state actor" for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In this setting a direct conflict of constitutional imperatives is unavoidable.
For this reason, the application of the proposed standard to teacher's inclass speech merits careful consideration.
(1) The Special Problem of the Abridgement of Teachers' InClass Speech
Although the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the extent
52
of the free speech rights of public school teachers in the classroom,
150. See supra note 129.

151. For a discussion of this point as it applies to public school teachers, see infra
note 153 and accompanying text.
152. In the absence of clear Supreme Court authority with respect to the free speech
rights of public school teachers in the classroom, the lower federal courts have adopted
broadly inconsistent standards that draw upon various strands of First Amendment
jurisprudence, principally the right of teachers and public employees generally to speak
on "matters of public concern," the limited free speech rights of public school students

in the classroom and other school-sponsored activities, and conceptions of educators'
academic freedom developed in contexts other than the public school classroom. These
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strands of First Amendment jurisprudence can, at best, be applied by analogy to the
qualitatively different context of the classroom and, as will be shown, the process of
analogy falls short of defining or resolving the unique set of constitutional issues arising
from a public school teacher's in-class speech.
1. The public employee free speech standard
In Pickering v. Board of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist. 205, 391 U.S. 563
(1968), the Supreme Court upheld the First Amendment right of a teacher to criticize the
administrative and budgetary practices of his public employer in a letter to the editor of
a local newspaper. In deciding that the teacher could not be sanctioned, the Court
balanced the interest of the employee "as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees." Id. at 568. The Pickering test,
which also applies to public employees other than teachers, can be understood as
generally protecting the expression of public employees when such expression is made
outside the scope of employment. It can also be understood as protecting the expression
of public employees made within the scope of employment, but under much narrower
circumstances, since expression in this context may impair the efficiency of government
operations. Id. Subsequently, the Court has made clear that public employees with a
policy-making or public contact role bear a greater "burden of caution... with respect
to the words they speak. . .

."

Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1987).

The Court has not yet distinguished between the personal and official speech of policymaking and public contact employees, but it can be presumed that the official speech of
a public employee in direct contact with members of the public would be afforded little,
if any, protection, at least under Pickering and its progeny. Thus, the Pickering test,
established in a decision that upheld a teacher's out-of-class private speech, is largely
irrelevant to the alternative context of in-class speech.
The Court's most recent pronouncement in the area of First Amendment rights of
public employees may appear at first glance to be relevant to the issue under
consideration in that the case implicates the free speech rights of a professor at a public
university. See Jeffries v. Harleston, 21 F.3d 1238, 1242 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that
"hateful and repugnant" remarks made as part of a speech by Professor Leonard Jeffries
of the City University of New York were entitled to some First Amendment protection),
vacated and remanded, 115 S. Ct. 503 (1994) (mem.). However, the case arose solely
from Professor Jeffries's out-of-classroom speech.
Moreover, Jeffries's First
Amendment claim was based on the relation of the speech to the university's subsequent
decision to remove Jeffries as a department chairman, a disciplinary action which, in any
event, had no effect on Jeffries's classroom duties or expression. See Jeffries v,
Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14 (2d Cir. 1995). The Supreme Court's decision, issued without
an opinion, vacated the Second Circuit's decision upholding the free speech rights of
Jeffries and affirming the trial court's reinstatement of Jeffries as department chairman.
Harleston, 115 S.Ct. at 503. The Court remanded the case "for further consideration
in light of Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994)." Id. at 503. The Second
Circuit, on remand, reversed its earlier decision and entered judgment for the university
defendants. See Harleston, 52 F.3d at 10 (holding that, under Waters, the First
Amendment did not prevent the university from removing Jeffries as a department
chairman because the action was motivated by "a reasonable belief' that the speech
would cause disruption of university operations). In reaching its conclusion, however,

1996]

ETHNOCENTRIC CURRICULUM INA MULTICULTURAL NATION

343

the Second Circuit noted that Jeffries's academic freedom was not at issue because the
university's action did not affect his status as a tenured professor, and that the university
"ha[s] not sought to silence him, or otherwise limit his access to the 'marketplace of
ideas' in the classroom." Id. at 14-15 (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967)). The Second Circuit's decision suggests, then, that classroom speech
is subject to an entirely different standard than Pickering. In sum, the Supreme Court
decisions generally affecting the First Amendment rights of public employees do not shed
much light on the special First Amendment concerns, including academic freedom, that
may affect the classroom speech of public school teachers and university professors.
2. The public school student free speech standard
In Hazlewood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), the Supreme Court
held that educational administrators may regulate student speech in school sponsored
activities as long as the administrators' "actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns." Id. at 273. Although the decision arose from editorial
restrictions imposed by school administrators on the school newspaper, the Hazlewood
Court made clear the standard should also apply to other school-sponsored expressive
activities that "bear the imprimatur of the school." Id. at 271. In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied on the public forum doctrine, and reasoned that the student
newspaper was not a limited public forum that by policy or practice was intended for
indiscriminate use by students, but was rather a "supervised learning experience for
journalism students." Id. at 270. Applying the Court's public forum analysis to
classroom instruction, the very essence of a supervised learning experience, it is
impossible to avoid the conclusion that educators may restrict student free speech rights
in the classroom when such restrictions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns. On the other hand, Hazlewood does not directly address the question of
whether educational administrators may restrict teachers' free speech rights in the
classroom or in other educational settings. On its face this question would appear to be
different in many significant respects from the question decided in Hazlewood.
Nevertheless, many lower federal courts have applied the Haziewood standard to cases
implicating the free speech rights of teachers. See, e.g., Silva v. University of New
Hampshire, 888 F. Supp. 293, 313 (D.N.H. 1994); Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066,
1073 (11th Cir. 1991); Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1056-57 (10th Cir. 1990).
Because teachers' free speech interests and their legal relation to a school administration
are so dramatically different from those of students, the Hazlewood standard, standing
alone, cannot adequately address the constitutional issues implicated in the regulation of
teachers' in-class speech.
3. General conceptions of academic freedom grounded in the First Amendment
The Supreme Court has recognized a broad First Amendment right of academic
freedom, but such recognition has arisen exclusively in contexts other than classroom
teaching. In dicta the Court has articulated a sweeping conception of academic freedom
that seemingly embraces the activities of educators inside and outside the classroom.
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) ("Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment . . . ."); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (citations omitted) (teachers require the utmost "'free
play of the spirit'");
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957)
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it has in dicta articulated a sweeping conception of academic freedom that
seemingly embraces the activities of educators inside and outside the

classroom."

If one gives the fullest possible reading to this dicta, it

may appear that the application of the proposed standard to a public school

teacher's in-class speech would pose a difficult and unavoidable conflict
of constitutional imperatives.

In fact, the proposed standard as applied to a public school teacher's
in-class speech is consistent with the principles of the First Amendment
in that the standard is narrowly tailored and abridges no more speech than
necessary. Thus, the standard respects fully the First Amendment

principles that disfavor vagueness and overbreadth. To the extent that the
standard could, in a particular case, be construed as abridging the speech

of a teacher, such abridgement would be in furtherance of the compelling
("Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust. Teachers and
students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate...."). The lower
federal courts have on occasion relied on this dicta in deciding cases implicating
teachers' free speech rights in the classroom. See, e.g., Dube v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
900 F.2d 587, 597-98 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying dictum of Shelton and holding that
generalized First Amendment conception of academic freedom extends to a professor of
a state university); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass. 1971)
(applying dictum of Keyishian and holding that generalized First Amendment conception
of academic freedom extends to secondary schoolteacher), aft'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.
1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala 1970) (same). While this
dicta does make clear that a general conception of academic freedom is grounded in the
First Amendment, it provides little if any practical guidance as to the circumstances
under which a teacher's academic freedom should give way to the legitimate conflicting
interests of educational administrators (who, after all, are also vested with academic
freedom grounded in the First Amendment) or indeed of conflicting considerations of a
constitutional order. See Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
In sum, the First Amendment status of teachers' in-class speech is complex and
unsettled. Some commentators have proposed new constitutional standards that would
help resolve the ambiguities and provide a coherent balancing of the often conflicting
interests of administrators, teachers, students and the public. See, e.g., Gregory A.
Clarick, Public School Teachersand the FirstAmendment: Protectingthe Right to Teach,
65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693 (1990); William H. Daughtrey, Jr., The Legal Nature of
Academic Freedom in United States Colleges and Universities,25 U. RICH. L. REv. 233
(1990); David M. Rabban, A FunctionalAnalysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227
(1990).
In any event, the proposed standard proscribing teaching a theory of inherent racial
superiority as fact is narrowly tailored and would abridge no more speech than is
necessary. Thus, the standard would respect the academic freedom of teachers in the
classroom and elsewhere. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
153. See supra note 153.
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state interest of racial non-discrimination," s and thus could be upheld
under a strict First Amendment reading. The fact that the standard
embodies a principle or power of the Constitution itself is the strongest
possible evidence that it furthers a compelling state interest 5 5 for
purposes of the First Amendment. In sum, the standard is responsive to
the concerns of the First Amendment and has been fashioned in such a
way as to minimize the potential conflict between the First and Fourteenth
Amendments.
(2) Additional First Amendment Considerations: The Proposed
Standard as a Bulwark to the Supreme Court's Conception of
Public Education as an "Assimilative Force" of Constitutional
Dimension
The Supreme Court has recognized "[t]he importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and
in the preservation of values on which our society rests. ... [P]ublic
school teachers . . . perform[] a task 'that goes to the heart of
representative government'"156 by means of "inculcating fundamental
values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system..
. .,,1 These observations suggest an explicit link between the role and
purpose of public schools and the important First Amendment goals of
representation reinforcement and the integrity of the democratic political
process.158
Then too, public schools promote other constitutional goals that can
be understood as arising from principles at the core of both the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
In particular, "public schools [are] an
'assimilative force' by which diverse and conflicting elements in our
59
society are brought together on a broad but common ground."
154. "[R]acial discrimination in education violates a most fundamental national
public policy, as well as rights of individuals." Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461
U.S. 574, 593 (1983).

155. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1944) (upholding
compulsory exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry as arising from the constitutional

war power of Congress and the executive branch).
156. Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979) (quoting Sugarman v.

Douball, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)).
157. Id. at 77.
158. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM.
B. FouND. REs. J.521 (1977).
159. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 77. See also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 ("[Education] is the very foundation of good citizenship... a principal instrument

in awakening the child to cultural values. . . ").
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Accordingly, "a State properly may regard all teachers as having an
obligation to promote civic virtues and understanding in their classes,
regardless of the subject taught."" 6 Surely, the teaching of a theory of
inherent racial superiority as fact is directly contrary to this understanding
of the special role and purpose of the public schools in the constitutional
order. "'

2. The Standard as Applied
In the foregoing discussion I have tried to make clear that a
constitutional standard prohibiting the teaching of inherent racial
superiority as fact is not inconsistent with established First and Fourteenth
Amendment principles. In particular I have argued that the constitutional
standard is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental
interest-indeed an interest secured by the Fourteenth Amendment

itself'462 -and abridges no more speech than necessary.' 63 I recognize,

though, that there are those who will argue that any regulation of speech
in this sensitive area, no matter how narrowly tailored, would carry with
it inherent overbreadth'
and vagueness"
difficulties,
and
160. Ambach, 441 U.S. at 80.
161. On the other hand, the Supreme Court also has on occasion expressed a view
of public education as a "marketplace of ideas" in which students are "trained through
wide exposure to ... [a] robust exchange of ideas . . . ." Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969) (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents
of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)). This conception of the First
Amendment and its application to the public schools is significantly different than the
application referenced above. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text.
164. An overbroad statute, regulation or other action of the government is "designed
to burden or punish activities which are not constitutionally protected, but [the action]
includes within its scope activities which are protected by the First Amendment." Hill
v. City of Houston, 764 F.2d 1156, 1161 (5th Cir. 1985) (citation omitted); see NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432 (1963); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940). Strictly speaking, the overbreadth
doctrine does not necessarily apply to my proposed standard, since the standard derives
from the Constitution itself. However, I have applied the overbreadth doctrine and other
First Amendment principles to the proposed standard in an effort to show its consistency
with other constitutional values and to avoid difficult and unresolved jurisprudential
issues associated with the ranking of constitutional values.
165. The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that government action affecting
expression, association and other First Amendment rights must be drawn with "narrow
specificity" because "[t]he threat of sanctions [against the exercise of these rights] may
deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions." Button,
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consequently would chill vital classroom speech and academic freedom
generally. For example, an argument could be advanced that the mere
existence of a standard proscribing the teaching of inherent racial
superiority as fact may cause a twelfth-grade social studies teacher to
avoid any classroom discussion of comparative social practices or customs
associated with various racial or ethnic groups for fear that such
discussion may implicate issues within the standard. Although this view
may appear plausible in the face of a standard that would restrict (however
narrowly) the academic freedom of high school teachers in public schools,
in fact the extreme narrowness of the standard would permit virtually
unfettered classroom discussion. To understand why this is so, it is
necessary to examine carefully the standard as applied and, in particular,
to recognize that the application of the standard is constrained by the
particular meaning that I ascribe to the various qualifying terms employed
in the standard.
In proposing a constitutional prohibition against teaching inherent
racial superiority as fact, I have stressed that "inherent" for my purposes
means a genetic or biological basis for a particular alleged racial
characteristic."
Thus, a teacher who compares or contrasts social or
cultural traditions associated with various racial or ethnic groups would
not, without more, implicate the standard. Similarly, a teacher who
presents comparative social science data correlated by race or ethnicity
would not, without more, implicate the standard. An express reference
to a genetic or biological basis for the alleged difference would be
necessary to bring the standard into play, and even then the teacher would
need to expressly characterize the genetic or biological basis as
"fact."167 For example, a teacher who recites the Murray-Herrnstein
thesis-that there is a correlation between performance on IQ tests and
biological intelligence, and that there is a further correlation between
biological intelligence and racial groups 68 -would not necessarily
implicate the standard, so long as the teacher does not expressly
characterize the Murray-Herrnstein thesis as "fact." 6 9
By a teacher's express characterization of a theory of inherent racial
superiority as "fact," I mean the teacher's unqualified statement that the
theory is true as well as the teacher's omission of any substantial reference
371 U.S. at 433.
166. See supra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
167. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75 for the meaning imputed to the term

"fact."
168. See THE BELL CURVE, supra note 50, at 298-315.

169. See infra text accompanying notes 172-75 for the meaning imputed to the term
"fact."
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to competing claims made by other relevant scientific theories that enjoy
some degree of support within the scientific community. In formulating
this aspect of the standard, I recognize that many scientific theories as
taught in the public schools may be presented as "fact" and without
qualification even when such theories are subject to considerable dispute
within the scientific community.17 With the exception of the teaching
of curricular material which a school board or teacher asserts to be true
but in fact is demonstrably false"7 ' and the teaching of a theory of
inherent racial superiority as fact,"If I do not propose to curtail the
authority of school boards or the academic freedom of teachers to present
curricular material in any way they deem appropriate, including, for
example, the presentation of scientific theories in a simplified manner
without reference to competing or inconsistent scientific theories.
However, in the special case of teaching theories of inherent racial
superiority as "fact," the standard proposed in this section would impose
affirmative obligations to teach the subject matter in a particular way (if
indeed a school board or public school teacher chooses to teach the subject
matter at all). Thus, under the standard, a teacher who elects to refer to
the Murray-Herrnstein eugenics theory or the Afrocentric melanist theory
may not teach such theories without qualification or discussion of other
competing or inconsistent theories. In sum, the standard would do no
more than impose a higher degree of academic rigor-a pedagogical form
of the "fairness doctrine" 7 3-if a school board or public school teacher
170. See supra note 132.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 53-122.
172. See supra text accompanying notes 123-63.
173. The Fairness Doctrine refers to a former policy of the Federal Communications
Commission that imposed an affirmative obligation on broadcast licensees to provide
"coverage of vitally important controversial issues of interest in the community served
by the licensees and ... a reasonable opportunity for the presentation of contrasting

viewpoints on such issues." Report Concerning General Fairness Doctrine Obligations
of Broadcast Licensees, 102 F.C.C.2d 143, 146 (1985). The Supreme Court upheld the

Fairness Doctrine as consistent with the requirements of the First Amendment in view
of the special characteristics of the broadcasting medium and the need to preserve the

medium as a "marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail." See Red Lion
Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Similarly, the Supreme Court has
referred to the public school as "peculiarly the marketplace of ideas" in which students

are afforded "wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth..
•. " Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512 (1969)
(citations omitted).
It is true that the Court's pedagogical theories are mere dicta and have never been
applied to strike down a one-sided public school curriculum. The proposed standard as
applied would do no more than give constitutional force to this dicta-thatis, to impose

a pedagogical fairness doctrine-when a school board or teacher chooses to incorporate
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chooses to teach a very limited and well-defended subset of curricular
material.
For all of the foregoing reasons, a constitutional standard proscribing
the teaching of a theory of inherent racial superiority as fact is narrowly
tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest, and abridges no
more speech than necessary. In particular, the standard would not
implicate the traditional First Amendment concerns of vagueness and
overbreadth, and thus should not chill classroom discussion and academic
freedom generally. As such, the standard would strike the proper
constitutional balance in an area fraught with constitutional conflict:
that is, the standard would remain consistent with speech-protective
principles enshrined in the First Amendment while carrying out the equal
protection principles that lie at the core of the Fourteenth Amendment. 175
C. The Constitution Prohibits the State From Establishing
a Schoolwide Ethnocentric Curriculum
That
1 76
Promotes Racial Segregation
1. Sources of Authority
Several major cities have established schools specially designed to
meet the academic and social needs of "at-risk" black students, especially
black male students." These schools are organized around curriculum
theories of inherent racial superiority into the curriculum. In my view, the Equal
Protection Clause requires no less than this. See supranotes 141-49 and accompanying

text.
174. See supra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
176. This section is derived in part from my earlier article, Steven Siegel, Race,

Education, and the Equal Protection Clause in the 1990s: The Meaning of Brown v.
Board of Education Re-examined In Light of Milwaukee's Schools of African American
Immersion, 74 MARQ. L. REV. 501 (1991). The earlier article was a relatively brief and
balanced treatment of arguments on both sides of the constitutional issue of separate
Afrocentric public schools. In the years since the completion of my earlier article and

after much thought, I have adopted the position articulated in this section. In contrast
to my earlier article, this section presents a considerably more detailed discussion of the
underlying values and the constitutional issues at stake in the Afrocentric public school
controversy.
177. See supra note 40 and accompanying text (discussing the establishment of
Afrocentric schools in Milwaukee, Seattle, and Detroit).
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Such schoolwide
that emphasizes black history and culture. 7 1
Afrocentric curriculum raises the question of whether these educational
programs-however well-intentioned-represent a new form of
unconstitutional state-sponsored segregation within the meaning of Brown
v. Board of Education19 and its progeny.t m
In applying Brown to a contemporary Afrocentric public school, the
threshold question is whether or not segregation of black students has
actually taken place under state sponsorship.'"' While Afrocentric
178. For example, the elementary school curriculum of Milwaukee's Schools of
African American Immersion incorporates the traditional subjects of vocabulary, math,
and music, "but Africa is always in the foreground as their point of reference." Dennis
Kelly, Afrocentric Studies: A Concept Rooted in Controversy, USA TODAY, Jan. 28,
1992, at 1D, 2D. The Principal of one of the Milwaukee schools describes the school's
educational mission as follows:
[W]e have children out there who are confused about who they are, who think
black is ugly. But you expect them to rise up out of an educational system run
by white people. How can they do that? They have to feel good about
themselves.. . . Our basic focus is on having children see themselves in the
curriculum.
Id. (statement of Principal Josephine Mosley).
179. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
180. In the five years since Milwaukee opened what was apparently the nation's first
Afrocentric school, there has been no reported litigation on whether this type of public
school represents unconstitutional state-sponsored racial segregation in public schools.
However, Detroit's Afrocentric schools-officially characterized as schools aimed at
meeting the special needs of at-risk black males-have been the subject of litigation solely
concerned with the issue of gender discrimination. See Garrett v. Board of Educ., 775
F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Mich. 1991) (enjoining school board from opening schools as allmale schools). The school board subsequently agreed to admit girls to the schools. See
Detroit BoardAgrees to Let Girls Attend Male-Only Academies, SCH. L. NEWS, Aug.
29, 1991, at 5. The issue of gender discrimination in the public schools is outside the
scope of this article. Also excluded from discussion is the applicability of statutory
remedies for racial and gender discrimination in the public schools pursuant to Titles IV
and VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et seq.
181. This question is rarely encountered in contemporary desegregation litigation.
Most such litigation of the past 25 years has concerned school districts that were subject
to de jure racial segregation prior to 1954 and, as a result of the Brown decisions,
became subject to continuing federal judicial supervision necessary to oversee the
desegregation remedy. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Brown 1)
(holding unconstitutional state-sponsored segregation of public schools); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 299-300 (1955) (Brown II) (authorizing the federal district
courts to fashion and enforce desegregation remedies consistent with the principles of
Brown I and Brown II). Thus in contemporary desegregation cases, a district court, as
part of its continuing supervisory responsibility, typically is required to assess whether
a school district has made progress toward the elimination of "vestiges" of the de jure
dual school system. Freeman v. Pitts, 112 S. Ct. 1430, 1445-46 (1992). This
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schools do not constitute de jure segregation of the type most clearly
implicated in Brown, subsequent Supreme Court school desegregation
decisions make it clear that the scope of the constitutional principle
recognized in Brown is not limited to invalidating and remedying the
effects of laws requiring dual public school systems. In Keyes v.
Denver," the Court considered racially "gerrymandered" school
attendance zones and held that the practice was invalid for the same reason
and to the same extent as statutorily mandated segregation."u In Griffin
v. County School Board,"8 the Court held that the closing of all public
schools in a county was unconstitutional because the Court found such
closings were motivated by the state's intention of preventing white and
black children from attending the same schools." 8 In other words, the
Court has subsequently interpreted the Brown holding to mean that the
state cannot do indirectly what it is prohibited from doing directly,
assuming, of course, that one can show the requisite intent.
When the school officials of Milwaukee and Detroit established
Afrocentric schools, these officials made clear that the schools were
established to meet the special needs of black students, especially "at-risk"
black male students. For example, a black member of the Milwaukee
school board who voted in favor of establishing Afrocentric schools
explained that the schools would "have an African-American perspective,
rather than a European-American perspective ... [because] [w]e want to
give our kids a good sense of self, a chance to relate to their identity and
culture."" 8 Similarly, the principal of Detroit's Malcolm X Academy,
determination may require the court to consider such factors as academic performance
of students, school funding, teacher salaries, and extracurricular activities. See, e.g.,
Missouri v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 2038, 2042-43 (1995). A court's consideration of these
factors, it is to be stressed, follows from an earlier finding of dejure segregation. See
Brown 11, 349 U.S. at 299-300. As such, these factors-and much of contemporary
desegregation litigation-are entirely irrelevant to the present question under
consideration: that is, do separate Afrocentric schools constitute a new form of
unconstitutional de jure segregation?
182. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
183. Id. at 201-04. The Court noted that "the practice of building a school... to
a certain size and in a certain location with conscious knowledge that it would be a
segregated school" is evidence that would support a finding of a constitutional violation.
Id. at 201-02 (citation omitted). In establishing Afrocentric schools, the school officials
of Milwaukee and Detroit made clear that these schools were expressly designed to serve
the needs of "at-risk" black males. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
184. 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
185. Id. at 231.
186. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 26 (statement of Joyce Mallory, member of
Milwaukee Board of Education) (emphasis added).
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an Afrocentric school, states, "[t]hese kids will (hear) that as an AfricanAmerican child, you [sic] came from the beginning of civilization.""
These statements indicate that the assignment of black students to the
Afrocentric schools of Milwaukee and Detroit is integral to the educational
purpose of the school officials and, as such, amount to a virtual admission
by these school officials that these Afrocentric schools are premised on a
policy of official racial segregation. In light of the teachings of Keyes v.
Denver'88 and Griffin v. County School Board,'89 a court might well
conclude that the Afrocentric schools of Milwaukee and Detroit are
unconstitutional.
In defense of their Afrocentric schools, Milwaukee and Detroit school
officials have argued that these schools are designed to meet the needs of
their existing school populations, which are predominantly black,"9° and,
in particular, the special needs of "at-risk" black males. 9 ' Moreover,
these officials have argued that the establishment of Afrocentric schools
has resulted in little net change in patterns of racial segregation in
education in view of the existing patterns of defacto racial segregation in
187. Kelly, supra note 180, at 2D (quoting Clifford Watson, principal of Detroit's
Malcolm X Academy) (emphasis added).
188. 413 U.S. 189 (1973); see supra notes 182-83 and accompanying text.
189. 377 U.S. 218 (1964); see supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.

190. InMilwaukee, total minority enrollment is over 70% of the student population,
and in Detroit total minority enrollment is over 90% of the student population. See
Johnson, supra note 37, at 26; Walters, supra note 40, at 8.
191. In establishing Afrocentric schools, the Milwaukee school board in 1990
acknowledged that it was acting in response to the special needs of black males, and

relied in part on statistics that showed the generally unsatisfactory academic performance
of this part of the student population: 2% of black males had either an A or B grade
point average, and only 17% had at least a C average. See Millicent Lawton, 2 Schools
Aimed for Black Males Set in Milwaukee, EDUC. WEEK, Oct. 10, 1990, at 1, 12. In
Detroit, the school official who played a major role in the establishment of Afrocentric
schools indicated that the schools are a response to an educational structure that "has not
worked" for black males. See Walters, supra note 40, at 8 (statement of Clifford
Watson, Detroit public school principal). Some black educators argue in favor of
separate Afrocentric schools because black and white students have different "learning
styles" and thus some traditional methods of teaching and testing are inappropriate for
black students. See Johnson, supra note 37, at 26 (statement of Dr. Jawanza Kunjufu).
See also Felix Boateny, Combatting Deculturizationof the African-American Child in the
Public School System in GOING TO SCHOOL, supra note 33, at 73. It is beyond the scope
of this article to assess the validity of pedagogical or social science claims made in
support of separate Afrocentric schools except to note that they appear to be flatly
contradictory to the social science claims that formed a basis for the Brown I decision.
See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.11 (1954); see also infra notes 21625 and accompanying text.
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Therefore, it may be argued that
housing and neighborhoods." T
Afrocentric schools, at least in these circumstances, are constitutional.
These arguments in favor of segregated schools, however, must fail
in the face of the clear constitutional requirement not to engage in
practices or policies that directly or indirectly promote racial segregation
in education. 93 This is the unequivocal standard set forth in Keyes' 94
There is no recognized exception to this standard
and Griffin.19
whereby a demonstrable attempt to segregate is permitted when it can be
shown that the actual immediate effect of such segregative intent is likely
to be little or no additional segregation. To recognize such an exception
would be to invite discriminatory conduct by school districts with student
populations that currently are predominantly or exclusively of one
race. 196
Alternatively, those who argue for the constitutionality of Afrocentric
schools could conceivably adopt the view that the schools, while
concededly established pursuant to a segregative intent, employ a form of
segregation which must now be recognized as "benign" and therefore
constitutionally permissible. In essence, this view would argue for the
recognition of a benign form of racial segregation in education that would,
in some sense, parallel the recognition of a benign form of racial
discrimination in employment," 9 and admission to higher education'98
(for example, affirmative action). The difficulty with this analogy is that
the remedy for racial segregation in education is, and has been since
192. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 37, at 26 ("In the urban school districts, we're
not educating large numbers of white children any more." (statement of Joyce Mallory,
Milwaukee school board member)).
193. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
194. 413 U.S. 189, 201-04 (1973); see supra note 183 and accompanying text.
195. 377 U.S. 218, 231 (1964); see supra note 185 and accompanying text.

196. One could imagine, for example, the school board of a predominantly or
exclusively white district in, for instance, Idaho prescribing a curriculum that included

teaching a doctrine of white supremacy. Although this state action may offend the
Constitution for other reasons, see supra notes 127-63 and accompanying text, it might
also violate the equal-protection principles recognized in Brown I and its progeny if a

court found that the school district instituted the curriculum so as to discourage present
or prospective minority students from attending schools in the district.
197. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (construing Title VII
of the Civir Rights Act of 1964 as permitting private, voluntary race-conscious

affirmative action plans.
198. See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)
(plurality opinion) (declaring that graduate school admissions programs which take into
account the race of an applicant as one factor among many to effectuate a benign purpose

is constitutionally permissible).
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Brown, desegregation, 1 not remedial segregation.
To recognize
remedial segregation as permissible under the Constitution is to render
incoherent forty years of school desegregation decisions.
Unlike
affirmative action in employment and housing, which can be reconciled
with a remedial understanding of equal opportunity, remedial segregation
cannot square with the fundamental principles underlying Brown and its
progeny.Z
Most strikingly, it is the principles articulated in Brown itself-that is,
the principles that led the Supreme Court to conclude that state-sponsored
racially segregated schools are inherently unequal and therefore
unconstitutional-that seemingly stand in direct and intractable opposition
to the very notion of separate Afrocentric public schools. These principles
are first, that racially segregated schools cannot be made equal because of
the existence of certain "intangible factors" which have the effect of
placing the schools reserved for black students at an inherent
disadvantage;"' second, the critical role of public education in
contemporary society,' and third, the psychological harm inflicted on
black children as a direct result of state-sponsored racial segregation in the
schools. 3 These principles, it must be conceded, arose from the
Court's consideration of a quite different legal context: an entrenched
statutory regime of educational apartheid that existed in seventeen states
in which blacks were compelled to attend inferior schools.'
Yet the
Brown principles, on their face, do not easily admit to an exception for the
contemporary circumstances giving rise to separate Afrocentric schools
and, in fact, seem to apply with undiminished power and urgency to those
circumstances.
Moreover, those who would read in an exception to
199. See Brown I, 349 U.S. at 301 (holding that the remedy for the constitutional
violation of state-sponsored racially segregated schools is desegregation, which must
occur with "all deliberate speed").
200. See infra notes 201-24 and accompanying text. At least one prominent black
legal scholar has endorsed a concept of remedial segregation and has termed the decision

in Brown I "a mistake." Alex M. Johnson, Jr., Bid Whist, Tonk and U.S. v. Fordice:
Why Integration Fails African-AmericansAgain, 81 CAL L. REv. 1401, 1409 (1993).
201. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-94.

202. Id. at 493.
203. Id. at 494-95.
204. See generally KLUGER, supra note 2.
205. At bottom, Brown seems premised on the fact that state-sponsored racially
segregated schools set aside for a racial minority group (in particular a racial group
consisting of less than 15% of the overall national population and suffering the effects
of long-term and continuing oppression) cannot be made equal with the schools set aside

for the majority racial group even if the resources available to the minority and majority
group schools are equalized. It may be that, in a hypothetical biracial society, one in
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the Brown principles at this late date would risk doing great
violence-even partly overturning-a decision that is universally
acknowledged to be of paramount legal, political, and historical
importance.26
In finding state-sponsored racially segregated schools inherently
unequal because of "intangible factors," the Brown Court expressly relied
on prior decisions arising from racial segregation in higher education.'
Examples of intangible factors in the context of a law school were set out
in Sweatt v. Painterdecided four years before Brown:
What is more important, the University of Texas Law School
possesses to a far greater degree [than the segregated black Texas
law school] those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school. Such
qualities, to name but a few, include reputation of the faculty,
experience of the administration, position and influence of the
alumni, standing in the community, traditions and prestige. It is
difficult to believe that one who had a free choice between these
law schools would consider the question close.
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession, we
are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The law
school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot
be effective in isolation from the individuals and institutions with
which the law interacts. Few students and no one who has
practiced law would choose to study in an academic vacuum,
removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange of views
with which the law is concerned. The law school to which Texas
is willing to admit petitioner excludes from its student body
members of the racial groups which number 85% of the
population of the State andinclude most of the lawyers, witnesses,
which two racial groups were nearly equal with respect to population and socio-economic
status, that "separate but equal" public schools could be a workable legal and practical

(although not necessarily moral) regime. But even assuming that "separate but equal"
public schools were a worthwhile goal, few would argue today that United States society,

forty years after Brown, approaches the characteristics of the above-described
hypothetical society. Thus, Brown's central premise remains as vital today as it did in
1954. Viewed in this light, the rationale for establishing separate Afrocentric public
schools, even if understood as arising from "benign" rather than "invidious" intent, does
not overcome the central premise of Brown. Neither by its terms nor by implication,
does Brown's central premise admit to an exception for "benign" or remedial statesponsored racial segregation.

206. See generally KLUGER, supra note 2.
207. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493 (citing Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950);
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950)).
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jurors, judges and other officials with whom petitioner will
inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of the Texas
Bar. With such a substantial and significant segment of society
excluded, we cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner
is substantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted
to the University of Texas Law School."3
Put another way, blacks in a white-dominated society will learn better or
learn more of what they need to learn in an integrated environment rather
than a segregated environment. Such intangible considerations, the Court
in Brown declared, "apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. "I
Brown's "intangible consideration" doctrine can be viewed as
diametrically opposed to Afrocentric schools in two ways. First, the
doctrine appears to embrace the goal of integration, not merely the
eradication of laws requiring segregation.21 ° Second, the doctrine
implicitly endorses a curriculum and an educational setting which prepares
the student for full participation in a society dominated by whites.21 ' It
is difficult to argue that Afrocentric schools will perform the assimilative
function implicit in Brown's "intangible factors" doctrine.
Moreover, the Brown Court goes beyond the "intangible factors"
doctrine developed in earlier decisions arising from postsecondary
schools 1 2 and considers the special role of elementary and secondary
public education in contemporary American society:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments. . . . It is required in the
208.
209.
210.
schools is

Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634 (emphasis added).
Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494.
Of course, as subsequent decisions make clear, the racial integrationof public
not a constitutional right, but rather a remedy when it has been determined that

public schools were subjected to state-sponsored racial segregation. See generallyBrown

I1,349 U.S. at 301 (holding that the remedy for constitutional violation of statesponsored racially segregated schools is desegregation, which must occur with "all
deliberate speed"). See also Deal v. Cincinnati, 369 F.2d 55, 62 (6th Cir. 1966) (stating
that the "mere fact of [racial] imbalance alone [in the public schools] is not a deprivation
of equality in the absence of discrimination"). As noted above, the Court's discussion
of racial integration of public schools in Brown I is limited to providing support to the
Court's legal conclusion that state-sponsored racially segregated public schools are
inherently unequal.

211. See Brown 1,347 U.S. 483.
212. See Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 629; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950).

1996]

ETHNOCENTRIC CURRICULUM INA MULTICULTURAL NATION

357

performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even
service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment.2 3
This passage assumes great significance with respect to the question of the
constitutionality of Afrocentric public schools because it reveals the Brown
Court's view of the nature and proper function of public school
curriculum.
Concepts such as "good citizenship," "cultural values" and "normal
adjustment to the environment" are, of course, highly subjective, and
could conceivably be appropriated by both supporters and opponents of
Afrocentric public schools to defend their respective positions. It seems
clear, however, that when considered in the narrow context of the Court's
earlier discussion of "intangible factors" and in the larger context of de
jure segregation giving rise to the Brown decision, that the Court by these
words intended to reinforce its view that the public school curriculum is
properly directed toward political, economic and social assimilation. If
state-sponsored segregated black schools in 1954 were not well-suited to
perform this function, then it may be difficult to make an argument
consistent with Brown that the separate Afrocentric public schools of today
are well-suited to perform this function.2" 4
The remaining argument advanced by the Brown Court (as to why
racially segregated public schools violate the Equal Protection Clause) is
that segregated public schools confer a stigma on black children. 215 This
argument was based at least in part on contemporary social science
research,1 6 the validity of which has been the subject of continuing
213. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 493.
214. Brown I, read broadly, does not condemn a multicultural curriculum, since
surely such a curriculum is consistent with overall educational objectives such as "good
citizenship," "cultural values" and a child's "normal adjustment to the environment."
See generally NAT'L HIsToRY STANDARDS, supra note 14; ONE NATION, supranote 14.

Rather, it is the establishment of separate public schools for teaching an "ethnocentric"
curriculum directed at a particular racial or ethnic group that offends Brown.
215. "To separate [black children] from others of similar age and qualifications
solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the
community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."
Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
216. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494 n. 11 (citing K.B. Clark, Effect Of PrejudiceAnd
DiscriminationOn PersonalityDevelopment, in PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING, at 135
(Helen Witmer & Pith Kotinsky eds., 1952); E. FRANKLIN FRAZIER, PH.D., THE NEGRO
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controversy and dispute.2 17 Today the pedagogical value of Afrocentric

schools is also at the center of scholarly controversy.2 8 However, it is
important to point out that some of the social scientists and educators who

favor Afrocentric schools base their support on precisely those
assumptions and values that would appear to be inimicable to the Brown

Court. Professor Kunjufu maintains that black children have different
"learning styles" than white children. 219

Professor Peek argues that

black students must receive a special political education, which is
something white society, and presumably white teachers, cannot give
them.'
These views on their face appear to be irreconcilable with the

Supreme Court's conclusion that separation of black students results not
in educational or psychological advancement of those students but in "a

feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community.""

Not

surprisingly, Dr. Kenneth Clark, upon whose social science research the
IN THE UNITED STATES (1949); PERSONALITY IN THE MAKING (Helen Witmer & Ruth
Kotinsky eds., 1952); Theodore Brameld, EducationalCosts, in DISCRIMINATION AND
NATIONAL WELFARE (R.M. MacIver ed., 1949); Isidor Chein, What are the
PsychologicalEffects of Segregation Under Conditions of Equal Facilities?, 3 INT'L J.
OPINION & ATTITUDE RES. 229 (1949); Max Deutscher and Isidor Chein, The
PsychologicalEffects of Enforced Segregation:A Survey of Social Science Opinion, 26
J.PSYCHOL. 259 (1948)).
217. See generally Ernest Van Den Haag, Social Science Testimony in the
DesegregationCases -A Reply to ProfessorKenneth Clark, 6 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1960);
Mark G. Yudof, SchoolDesegregation:LegalRealism, ReasonedElaborationandSocial
Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978).
218. Spencer H. Holland, Director of the Center for Educating African-American
Males at Morgan State University and Jomills H. Braddock, Director of the Center for
Research on Effective Schooling for Disadvantaged Students at Johns Hopkins University
expressed support for the concept of separate Afrocentric schools at the time when
Milwaukee announced its Schools of African-American Immersion. See Millicent
Lawton, supranote 191 at 12; William H. Watkins, Black Curriculum Orientations:A
PreliminaryInquiry, 63 HARv. EDUC. REv., 321, 331-32 (1993). Other prominent
scholars and educators, including Charles V. Willie, a professor of education at Harvard
University and Dr. Shirley Thornton, California's Deputy Superintendent of Education,
expressed strong opposition to Milwaukee's initiative. Johnson, supra note 37, at 26.
See generally Jacqueline Berrien, A Civil Liberties Imperative: Promoting Quality
Educationfor All African-American Children, 94 TcHRs. C. REc. 790 (1993) (discussing
the effects of separating African-American boys and girls); Patricia A. Jones, Educating
Black Males-Several Solutions, But No Solution, CRISIS, Oct. 1991, at 12; Joan

Morgan, All-Black Male Classrooms Run Into Resistance, BLACK

ISSUES IN HIGHER

EDUC., Jan. 17, 1991, at 1.
219. Johnson, supra note 37, at 26 (statement of Dr. Jawanza Kunjufu).
220. Lomotey, supra note 38, at 14-15 (statement of Professor Booker Peek).
221. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 494.
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Brown Court expressly relied,'m has stated his strong opposition to
separate Afrocentric schools.
In response to the establishment of
Milwaukee's Schools of African-American Immersion, Dr. Clark declared,
"I didn't expect that anybody would come up with anything like this. This
is what I was fighting against. . . . It's a continuation of the whole
segregation nonsense."'
For Dr. Clark, then, separate Afrocentric
schools, notwithstanding their arguably remedial and benign purposes, are
as much of a constitutional violation as the state-sponsored racially
segregated school of Topeka, Kansas in 1954.
In light of the foregoing considerations, the recognition of a principle
of "remedial segregation" should be rejected. As noted above, to
recognize "remedial segregation" as permissible under the Constitution is
necessarily to render incoherent forty years of school desegregation
decisions. 4 The fundamental principles underlying the Brown decision
remain sound and do not warrant reconsideration at this late date. Instead,
the Brown principles should be reaffirmed by the recognition of a clear
constitutional standard prohibiting the states from establishing schoolwide
ethnocentric curriculum that promotes racial segregation.
2. The Standard as Applied
The standard as applied does not unduly restrict the authority of a
state or a school board to prescribe curriculum covering social, historical,
cultural or civic issues. A school board remains free to establish a
comprehensive social studies curriculum with a multicultural and
multiethnic focus. Such a curriculum is to be encouraged,' and indeed
is a statutory requirement in some states.'
Moreover, the standard
would not preclude a school board from establishing, as part of the
general multicultural curriculum within a school, individual course
offerings devoted to the study of particular racial or ethnic groups,
languages, or cultures.
The standard is implicated only if a school board dedicates an entire
public school to a curriculum or a curricular approach centering on the
study of a particular racial or ethnic group. Such a school can be fairly
characterized as ethnocentric rather than multicultural. The physical
222. Id.
223. Samuel Francis, At Segregation'sNewest Frontier,WASH. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1991, at F3 (statement of Dr. Kenneth Clark).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 200-01.
225. See, e.g., NAT'L HISTORY STANDARDS, supra note 14; ONE NATION, supra
note 14; see also supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.

226. See supra note 21.
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isolation of an ethnocentric school plainly promotes a form of segregation
that is much more profound and far-reaching than a school which offers
specialized ethnic studies courses as part of a more general curriculum,
even if, in the latter case, the ethnic studies courses promote some
intraschool segregation as a result of student enrollment patterns in the
ethnic studies courses.
The fact that the standard implicates interschool but not intraschool
segregation arising from a particularized ethnic studies curriculum is not
an inconsistency. As noted above, the first form of segregation is
qualitatively different than the second. More fundamentally, the standard
properly does not implicate specialized ethnic course offerings within a
school because of the very nature of formal education itself: schools must
organize their educational programs around discrete disciplines and
subjects. Absent some actual evidence of an invidious intent to segregate,
the foregoing considerations militate against presuming such an intent
based solely on the subject matter of some course offerings within a
school.'
If anything, a multiplicity of course offerings within a school,
including individual courses devoted to particular ethnic or cultural
subjects, is evidence of a comprehensive social studies curriculum. State
sponsorship of such curriculum promotes a healthy respect and
understanding of different cultures and ethnic groups. 2 8 By contrast,
state sponsorship of schoolwide ethnocentric curriculums conveys a very
different message, a message of exclusion, isolation and stigma. 9 Such
a message was condemned by the Supreme Court in 19541 ° and should
be condemned in its present form.

227. This interpretation of intraschool segregation comports with existing law.
Compare NAACP v. State of Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403 (11th Cir. 1985) (placement of
students in classes by academic ability, without proof of intent to engage in racial
segregation, does not violate Equal Protection Clause, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 or the Equal Education Opportunity Act) with McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (invalidating state university regulation mandating physical
segregation of black students from other students within classrooms and other school
facilities of the University of Oklahoma).
228. See NAT'L HISTORY STANDARDS, supranote 14; ONE NATION, supra note 14;
see also supra notes 21-29 and accompanying text.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 201-24.
230. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 494 ("To separate [black children] from others of similar
age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to
their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone.").
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IV. CONCLUSION
This country has been able to celebrate pluralism but keep some
sense of the collective that holds us together. . . . Democracy
has certain core ideas-freedom of speech, law, procedural rights,
the way we deal with each other. If everything becomes hostile
race and class warfare, we are going to lose this country. The
issue is not multiculturalism. We agree with that. The question
is, Are you also going to talk about the political and moral values
that are essential for us to live together?"1
These words were spoken by California's Superintendent of Public
Instruction, a person in the center of a political maelstrom concerning
curricular content in the public schools. 2 As the nation becomes ever
more multiethnic and multicultural, this controversy can be expected to
become even more difficult and contentious.
This article has not proposed comprehensive judicial oversight over
public school curriculum. Such a proposal would be anti-democratic,
unworkable and without legal foundation. Moreover, comprehensive
judicial oversight would undermine the current debate which, for the most
part, is the very model of a public dialogue that is "uninhibited, robust,

and wide-open. "3
Still, there is a legitimate and limited role for the judiciary in this
controversy which would draw on the traditional strengths of the judiciary
to enforce core constitutional values and to promote the stability and
integrity of our political institutions.
This article has proposed
judicial oversight of three well-defined and justiciable failures of
educational policy-making, all of which are associated with ethnocentric
curriculum. The policy failures have been identified as first, secular
educational material that the state asserts is true but, in fact, is
demonstrably false; second, the teaching of theories of inherent racial
superiority as fact; and third, establishment of schoolwide ethnocentric
curriculum that promotes racial segregation. These policy failures are
deeply disturbing in that they suggest a breakdown of the political process
and a threat to core constitutional values.
In 1954 the Supreme Court moved to correct a deep injustice
embedded in our system of public education for which the political
231. Reinhold, supra note 23, at 47 (statement of California Superintendent of
Public Instruction Bill Honig).
232. Id. at 26-29.

233. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
234. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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Today the new
branches were unable or unwilling to correct."5
constitutional challenges presented by radical ethnocentric curriculum
demonstrate, somewhat ironically and painfully, how much progress has
been made in forty years and, at the same time, how difficult and how
central remain the underlying problems of race and ethnicity. The role
proposed for the courts in the present controversy would not be nearly as
significant as was the role played by the courts forty years ago; still, the
courts can perform a vital function in the continuing national struggle to
define and come to terms with our history, culture, and ethnicity.

235. Brown I, 347 U.S. 483.

